Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law
Volume 23

Issue 4

Article 1

2021

Labor Organization in Ride-Sharing—Unionization or Cartelization?
Mark Anderson
Max Huffman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mark Anderson and Max Huffman, Labor Organization in Ride-Sharing—Unionization or Cartelization?, 23
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 715 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol23/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law by an authorized editor of
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Labor Organization in
Ride-Sharing—Unionization
or Cartelization?
Mark Anderson & Max Huffman*
ABSTRACT
The sharing economy brings together the constituent parts of a
business enterprise into a structure that, on its surface, resembles a
business firm, but in crucial ways is nothing like the traditional firm.
This includes the ownership of the primary capital assets used in the
business, as well as one of the most fundamental features of a firm—the
relationship with its labor force. Sharing economy workers are formally
contractors, running small businesses as sole entrepreneurs, with the
effect that they are excluded from many of the protections made available
to workers across the economy. The result is a seeming disparity across
the market, with consumers realizing benefits of choice and price that
did not exist before and platforms possibly poised to turn profits as the
hubs of massive enterprises with few of the burdens of a dependent
workforce.
This Article explains how existing antitrust law would not allow
labor organization by sharing economy workers. Even under a possible
Rule of Reason approach, the worker protection goals that underlie
collective bargaining are not cognizable efficiency justifications for
collective bargaining. However, this Article also shows that existing
law ignores the well-developed economic theory that supports labor
organization as a response to monopsony, and how that theory supports
the idea of labor organization as having pro-consumer effects.
This Article identifies two primary market structures—the
fallow-assets model and the locked-in model—and shows how in the first
*
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structure the effect of organization would be to increase output in the
labor market, leading to increased output and lower price in the
consumer market, while in the second structure the effect of organization
is likely to lead to harm in the consumer market. Outcome ambiguity
and the novel enterprise structure militate for a Rule of Reason
treatment of labor organization in ride-sharing. In operation, this
produces the uncomfortable result that the workers least in need of labor
protections are most likely to succeed in avoiding liability, while those
most in need of protections are most likely to be subjected to damages
and injunctions. As a result, non-antitrust labor protections remain
essential.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The sharing economy reflects an extraordinary whole-cloth
creation of social welfare, allowing a seemingly infinite range of fallow
assets to be exchanged in welfare-enhancing transactions.1 Physical
assets—cars, houses, bicycles, tools, couches—that previously were
underutilized might now be the basis for economic exchange.2 Labor
assets—individuals’ time and talent—that were underused, whether
because of underemployment or because individuals felt their capacity
extended beyond the traditional workweek, might now support that
transaction.3 On the consumption side, those individuals previously
excluded from the market might now transact as output of services
increases and price decreases commensurately. Trivially easy market

1.
In earlier scholarship, the Authors identify key features of sharing economy
enterprises across a range of sectors of the economy. See Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, The
Sharing Economy Meets the Sherman Act: Is Uber a Firm, a Cartel, or Something in Between?,
2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 864–86. Features of sharing economy enterprises change regularly
as the business model matures.
2.
See generally NIAM YARAGHI & SHAMIKA RAVI, BROOKINGS INST. INDIA CTR., THE
CURRENT AND FUTURE STATE OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 12–15 (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2016/12/sharingeconomy_032017final.pdf [https://perma.cc/25YZ-HHZC].
3.
A recent Federal Reserve Bank study finds 3 percent of US adults are engaged in
ride-sharing work, with most involved as income supplements rather than as a primary means of
earning money. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC
WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018, at 18–19 (2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-report-economic-well-being-us-households-201905.pdf?smid=nytcore-ios-share
[https://perma.cc/97BW-ZJJR].
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entry and exit in industries with sharing economy enterprises free both
consumers and suppliers to alter decisions based on continually shifting
preferences. The ripple effects in adjacent or upstream and downstream
markets also promise benefits. The possibility to use a new car to
earn revenue may incentivize a value-enhancing purchase to improve
outcomes in markets for automobile manufacture and sale. The
opportunity to earn revenue in the sharing economy increases worker
choice in other markets, potentially bidding up the price of labor for
low-skill jobs.4 Consumers may increase their consumption of travel
(using Airbnb for lodging); social engagement (using Uber to enable a
night out); and home maintenance (using TaskRabbit for services).5
With sharing economy work able to fill the gap between long-term jobs,
or potentially replace alternative employment entirely, workers have
increased ability to move to economic opportunity.6
Sharing economy enterprises, like Uber and Airbnb, have cut a
huge swath across the modern economy. However, in doing so, sharing
economy enterprises have posed challenging questions for legal and
regulatory regimes ranging from zoning and environmental regulation
to employment law and antitrust. This Article analyzes how antitrust
law should apply to attempts by workers in sharing economy
enterprises to jointly negotiate the terms and conditions of their
relationships with platform companies, particularly ride-sharing
services. It suggests reconceptualizing Sherman Act doctrine in light of
economic analysis of the market for sharing economy workers that this
Article develops.
Sharing economy enterprises bear superficial similarity to one
another. Whether the industry is transportation, lodging, task services,
or another, the dominant mode of enterprise organization consists of
individual suppliers, platforms, and consumers.7 However, below the
surface the enterprises display more variety than consistency. Prior
scholarship has explained those differences and their implications
for one particular aspect of antitrust law.8 In part because of the
complexity, this Article concentrates its argument on the ride-sharing

4.
See YARAGHI & RAVI, supra note 2, at 20–22.
5.
For websites describing sharing economy services offered, see generally AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2021); UBER, https://www.uber.com/ (last visited Mar.
8, 2021); TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
6.
Cf. YARAGHI & RAVI, supra note 2, at 20.
7.
The legal relationships among these three parties is a matter of dispute. See generally
infra Part II; Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1.
8.
See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 864–81, 917–31.
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industry, primarily represented in the United States by Uber and Lyft.9
As a matter of terminology, this Article refers to the ride-sharing
workforce as “workers.” The hub around which the marketplace is
organized is the “platform,” and together with the workers this is the
“sharing economy enterprise.”10 The users of services are “consumers.”
Recent news reports identify two sorts of coordination on the
most competitively sensitive of topics among drivers on ride-sharing
platforms in the United States. One is a species of conduct sometimes
called “surge-price manipulation,” in which drivers combine to
strategically withdraw their services, causing the price algorithm to
increase the ride price and permit individual drivers to take advantage
of the increased price.11 The other is an effort to engage in classic labor
organization and collective bargaining with the platform, through
which drivers will collectively withhold their services unless the terms
at which those services are provided become more generous, perhaps
even through a drivers’ strike.12 Under classic antitrust principles, both
of these should be considered cartel conduct. Such conduct is illegal per
se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act13—invalid without any analysis
of the actual possibility of an effect on the market causing harm to

9.
UBER, https://www.uber.com/; LYFT, https://www.lyft.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
Other competitors also exist, although these are localized and do not register on nationwide
market reports. See, e.g., Market Share of the Leading Ride-Hailing Companies in the United
States from September 2017 to December 2020, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/
910704/market-share-of-rideshare-companies-united-states/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2021) (depicting
the “Other” category’s shrinkage from 4 percent to effectively 0 percent over the three years
studied).
10.
See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 870.
11.
See Jacob Siegal, Uber Drivers Are Reportedly Manipulating the App to Create
Artificial Surge Pricing, BGR (June 14, 2019, 4:16 PM), https://bgr.com/2019/06/14/uber-surgepricing-manipulation-drivers/ [https://perma.cc/3U89-UCY4].
12.
See generally RIDESHARE DRIVERS UNITED, https://drivers-united.org/about
[https://perma.cc/46UQ-LU8G] (last visited Aug. 21, 2020) (discussing efforts to achieve collective
goals); Sara Ashley O’Brien, Why Uber and Lyft Drivers Are Striking, CNN BUS.,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/07/tech/uber-driver-strike-ipo/index.html [https://perma.cc/5MJ2SAY7] (May 8, 2019, 11:34 AM); Alexia Fernández Campbell, Thousands of Uber Drivers Are
Striking in Los Angeles, VOX (Mar. 25, 2019, 4:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/25/18280718/
uber-lyft-drivers-strike-la-los-angeles [https://perma.cc/6ZG8-GMCG]. Whether ironically or not,
the success in organizing this work stoppage turned on the development of an app by Rideshare
Drivers United. Noam Scheiber & Kate Conger, Uber and Lyft Drivers Gain Labor Clout, with
Help from an App, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/business/uber-lyft-drivers.html [https://perma.cc/L88C-LAMT] (July 14, 2020).
13.
Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1).
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consumers14—and is in fact the sort of conduct that is regularly
prosecuted criminally by the US Department of Justice.15
In the case of suppliers in sharing economy enterprises,
however, the application of the per se rule and the possibility of criminal
prosecution seem to be overkill, at a minimum.16 Some go further to
argue that it is categorically inappropriate in light of the relative
bargaining positions of the participants in a transaction through a
sharing economy enterprise—the worker, the platform, and the
consumer.17 The literature on the antitrust implications of ride-sharing
enterprises is missing an analysis that takes into account the wide
variety of factual scenarios present among sharing economy
enterprises, the economic and other social justifications for imposing or
not imposing liability for anticompetitive conduct, and the common-law
development of antitrust rules in the US system. This Article fills that
gap.
A sharing economy enterprise dramatically reallocates the risks
and rewards of business compared to a traditional firm. This
reallocation has occurred without a fundamental assessment of the
legal structures in play. In a traditional firm, risks and rewards are
allocated among investors, managers, and workers through legal
infrastructures that have evolved over a century of legislation,
common-law development, markets, and cultural norms and
expectations.18 Investors provide capital and share profits or losses
from the operation of the firm.19 Managers hire employees, who follow
direction from managers and are owed their salaries and wages even if
the firm loses money.20 Employees are protected by a set of regulatory
requirements regarding minimum wages, public and private retirement
systems, occupational safety, antidiscrimination, unemployment

14.
See infra Section II.A.
15.
See ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, at I-2 (5th ed.
2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761166/download [https://perma.cc/465T-4KY2].
16.
To be sure, the fact of criminal liability does not necessarily imply there will be
criminal prosecution. Small scale cartel conduct can fly beneath the radar of overextended
antitrust enforcers. See ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2021 CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET SUBMISSION 3–11 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/doj/page/file/1246281/download
[https://perma.cc/6B36-SUZ2].
17.
See, e.g., Eugene K. Kim, Note, Labor’s Antitrust Problem: A Case for Worker Welfare,
130 YALE L.J. 428 (2020).
18.
See generally Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 884–86.
19.
This “residual claimant” understanding dates at least to the nineteenth century. See
generally Jacob H. Hollander, The Residual Claimant Theory of Distribution, 17 Q.J. ECON. 261
(1903).
20.
Mark Anderson, The Enigma of the Single Entity, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 497, 515–16
(2014) (discussing R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)).
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insurance, and health insurance.21 Employees are also allowed to jointly
negotiate wages and other terms of employment through collective
bargaining without violating the antitrust laws.22
A sharing economy enterprise reshuffles these rights and
responsibilities in significant ways to which the law is only beginning
to respond. Like investors in a traditional firm, workers in a sharing
economy enterprise provide capital. In a ride-sharing enterprise, this is
the acquisition (by purchase or lease) and maintenance of the car.
However, unlike investors in a traditional firm, workers do not share in
the profits generated by the enterprise as a whole. Unlike employees in
a traditional firm, sharing economy workers are not guaranteed any
form of compensation net of car expenses. Nothing in the driver’s
contract prevents their working for nothing—if, for example, capital
costs exceed earnings.23 Similarly, under the current state of US law,
sharing economy workers are not provided any of the regulatory
protections of employees.24 Collective bargaining by sharing economy
workers would be condemned as an anticompetitive cartel by the
current Sherman Act doctrine.25
How should the law deal with the reallocation of rights and
responsibilities resulting from the creation of sharing economy
enterprises? One possibility is to try to fit the new relationships into the
old categories. Most discussed is trying to characterize sharing economy
workers as employees, with the platform as employer.26 As employees,
workers would be entitled to wages, regardless of whether the
enterprise was making money. They would also be protected by the
employment regulatory structure. As employees, workers could
21.
See, e.g., Employee Rights, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/small-business/employee-rights [https://perma.cc/HM7R-PX46]
(last visited Mar. 8, 2021); Employee Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/disability/employeerights [https://perma.cc/QU3P-B9BG] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021);
Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/flsa [https://perma.cc/4F3T-4ABR] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021); OSHA Worker Rights and
Protections, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.osha.gov/workers/ [https://perma.cc/WK3E-9TRE]
(last visited Mar. 8, 2021); Labor Laws and Issues, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/labor-laws
[https://perma.cc/JPR2-HAMS] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
22.
See infra Section II.B.2.
23.
Cf. infra Section III.B.2.
24.
See generally O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1123–26 (N.D. Cal.
2016) (discussing litigation risks to drivers claiming misclassification and right to employee
status).
25.
Cf. Chamber of Com. v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing
dismissal for immunity and remanding for consideration of Sherman Act Section 1 claims in suit
alleging city-mandated driver organization constituted a price-fixing agreement).
26.
A theoretical alternative is to make the driver an employee of the customer. The
Authors are aware of no serious arguments to that effect.
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collectively bargain free from Sherman Act liability. The determination
of whether sharing economy workers should be characterized as
employees involves questions of doctrine and policy that make the
outcome unclear. These questions have resulted in limited success for
advocates of such a recharacterization.
In the absence of such a recharacterization, how should joint
negotiation by sharing economy workers be treated for purposes of
the Sherman Act? This Article answers that question. It analyzes the
question of whether sellers of labor inputs into a sharing economy
enterprise should be able to combine to gain the benefits of joint market
power in their negotiations with buyers. This question implicates a host
of thorny issues of antitrust law and policy, some of which are older
than the Sherman Act itself and others are as modern as the recently
revitalized debate over the role of “bigness” in antitrust.27 These issues
are knit together in this Article.
This Article shows that sharing economy enterprises present
concerns for monopsony in labor markets, leading to the likelihood
that suppliers of labor to sharing economy enterprises will be
under-compensated relative to the competitive equilibrium. The
acuteness of this problem turns on characteristics of the market and
can vary based on the particular geography in which services are
offered and consumed. The law’s current approach to resolving this
problem—permitting organization by employees through collective
bargaining under an exemption from antitrust law28—does not,
under the current state of federal antitrust law, help sharing economy
workers, who would be classified as independent contractors rather
than employees under the existing multifactor test for defining
employment.29 This failure may best be resolved by permitting
collective bargaining activity that promises increased marketplace
efficiency by correcting for monopsony effects in the labor market.
Whether such increased efficiency exists depends on the characteristics
of each sharing economy marketplace in question. It is therefore not
properly the subject of per se rules, either condemning or exempting the
collective conduct. It is best resolved through a structured application
of antitrust law’s Rule of Reason. Finally, conduct that is categorically
separate from collective bargaining, including the reports of surge price

27.
See, e.g., Lina M. Kahn, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710,
741–42 (2017).
28.
See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing antitrust’s labor exemption).
29.
See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing antitrust litigation brought against the City of
Seattle for attempting to establish a bargaining unit for ride-share drivers).
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manipulation, offers no possibility of competitive benefit and should
remain illegal per se.
This Article’s analysis uncovers a perversity that may support
arguments to legislate for solutions the market and exemptions from
antitrust law do not provide. The procompetitive rationale for
labor organization among sharing economy suppliers—establishing
countervailing market power to overcome the harm caused by
monopsony—arises in the case of suppliers least needing the benefits of
organization. Those suppliers fit into what this Article terms the
“fallow-assets” model of the sharing economy and can enter and exit the
market easily. In contrast, suppliers who have made substantial
commitments to their work in the particular market, meeting what this
Article terms the “locked-in” model are unlikely to successfully assert a
procompetitive rationale for organizing.30 This Article concludes that
antitrust law is not an effective tool for resolving this paradox, which
instead is a basis for resolution as a matter of labor policy or a social
insurance scheme. Both are beyond the scope of this Article.
The Article avoids an approach that some scholars have favored
in recent years of more broadly defining the constituencies the law
protects.31 Sometimes labeled “Neo-Brandeisian” antitrust, ideas of
including workers, input suppliers, or even more tangentially impacted
third parties in the set of recognized victims of market effects have
substantial currency and surface appeal.32 If one could prove market
effects from conduct impacting consumers, workers, and possibly
others, the law might permit any affected party to remedy the harm,
with benefits flowing to all market participants and others affected
by the conduct. It might also be possible to identify goals, such as
correcting for wealth disparities, that justify either antitrust
interventions (challenging monopoly or monopsony) or antitrust
exceptions (allowing monopolization or monopsonization by less
wealthy market participants).33
These arguments are subject to an acute critique that points to
the incommensurability of competing goals. This threatens to reduce
antitrust analysis to an “I know it when I see it” approach to defining
harm.34 As others have shown and the Authors explain here, worker
30.
31.

See infra Sections III.B, IV.B.
See, e.g., MARSHALL STEINBAUM & MAURICE E. STUCKE, ROOSEVELT INST., THE
EFFECTIVE COMPETITION STANDARD (2018).
32.
See, e.g., Tim Wu, After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The “Protection of Competition”
Standard in Practice, ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2018, at 3–7, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249173.
33.
See id. at 9–12.
34.
See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1375, 1440–41 (2009); cf. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Collective Bargaining and Competition: The
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interests may be consistent with consumer interests or opposed to
consumer interests.35 In the case of the former, continuing to treat
consumer protection as the goal of antitrust will serve worker interests
as well. In the case of the latter—interests in opposition—it is hard to
imagine a principled way to determine which outcome should be
preferred or how to measure the outcomes to balance them.36
Part II analyzes the impact of current antitrust doctrine on
sharing economy workers who jointly negotiate with platform
companies. It does so first by analyzing the current Sherman Act
doctrine and then by analyzing the potential for applying the exemption
for traditional collective bargaining. Part III analyzes the underlying
economic structure of markets for labor. It does so first by examining
markets for traditional employment. It then assesses how markets for
sharing economy workers operate. In doing so, this Article identifies
two different types of sharing economy workers and how markets for
each type differ, as well as the perversity that the economic justification
for labor organization is most likely to arise in the case of workers least
needing the protections. Part IV analyzes prior scholarship regarding
workers’ rights and the conflict with antitrust law. It outlines three
representative approaches, all of which offer ways in which antitrust
law could give way to allow greater worker protections. This Article
argues for a new, alternate approach under which Sherman Act
doctrine might adjust to reflect the economics of the labor markets
analyzed in Part III.
II. CURRENT LEGAL TREATMENT OF SHARING ECONOMY DRIVERS
A. Current Legal Treatment of Agreements Among Sharing Economy
Suppliers
For almost 130 years, the Sherman Act has been the principal
vehicle for federal courts to assess the competitive significance of
conduct.37 If sharing economy workers jointly negotiate with the
Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 16–17, 23–24 (1963)
(discussing specifically the different goals of collective bargaining and antitrust). Possible benefits
from these approaches include increasing the range of potential plaintiffs (thus, better ensuring
antitrust challenges to monopoly) and resolving recalcitrant social problems not adequately
addressed elsewhere in law or economics.
35.
See Hiba Hafiz, Labor Antitrust’s Paradox, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 391–92 (2020)
(discussing the effect of a labor market restraint favoring workers over consumers).
36.
Id. at 395–96.
37.
The competitive effects of coordinated conduct by multiple economic actors are
assessed under Section One of the Act, which outlaws “contract[s], combination[s], and
conspirac[ies] . . . in restraint of trade.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. The competitive effects of conduct by a single
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platforms, three questions arise under Section 1 of the Act. First, are
the drivers part of a single entity and therefore incapable of conspiring
for purposes of the Sherman Act? Second, if the drivers are not
protected by the single entity rule, have they entered into an agreement
with each other? Third, if such an agreement exists, will its competitive
effect be assessed under a rule of per se illegality—illegal by virtue
of the agreement itself, irrespective of its effects—or the Rule of
Reason—illegal if it causes or is expected to cause harm in the
market?38 This Section analyzes these questions under existing
authority. It concludes that collective action by drivers, even if directed
to curing market imperfections from monopsony, would be treated as
per se illegal and subject to automatic invalidation. Parts III and IV
argue that this approach fails to take into account significant aspects of
the economic relationship among the drivers, the platform companies,
and consumers.
1. Agreements Among Sharing Economy Suppliers Are Not Protected
by the Single Entity Rule
The first element of a Section 1 claim is that an agreement must
exist among separate economic actors.39 In Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., the US Supreme Court held that a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring
under Section 1 because they are not pursuing separate economic
interests.40 In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,41 the
Court held that NFL teams were capable of conspiring under Section 1
because—distinct from the facts of Copperweld—they were organized
as independent firms and not as subsidiaries of a parent corporation;
they were pursuing separate economic interests.42 Employees of a firm
are considered part of the firm for purposes of Section 1 and are
incapable of conspiring with each other or the firm when they are
pursuing the interests of the firm.43
firm are assessed under Section Two, which outlaws “monopoliz[ing . . .] any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States.” 15 U.S.C. § 2.
38.
See generally KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 104–12 (2003) (explaining the per se rule and Rule of Reason).
39.
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 770–71 (1984). In prior
scholarship, the Authors analyzed this question in depth with regard to coordination among
suppliers and the platform through the sharing economy enterprise. Anderson & Huffman, supra
note 1, at 898–917.
40.
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777.
41.
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
42.
Id. at 200–01.
43.
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 770–71.
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If sharing economy workers were deemed to be part of a single
entity in conducting joint negotiations with the platform companies, the
negotiations would be legal under Section 1 since no agreement among
the workers would exist.44 In Copperweld and American Needle, the
Court focused on combined economic interest in determining whether
the single entity rule applied. Suppliers jointly negotiating for better
terms have a shared desire for better terms but have not combined their
economic interest to a sufficient degree to qualify as a single entity.45
Prior scholarship reconciled the rules in Copperweld (holding
separately incorporated businesses were a single entity) and American
Needle (holding independent football teams were not a single entity
even when cooperating in a joint licensing scheme) by reference to the
sharing of profits and losses that characterizes integration into a firm.46
Owners of a business entity pool their revenues and costs to share the
resulting profits or losses. This sharing of profits and losses creates
incentives for efficiencies that justify single entity treatment. Sharing
economy workers share neither costs nor revenues among themselves
or with the platform. Each incurs their own costs and keeps the revenue
generated by their rides. A mere common desire to charge more does
not justify single entity treatment.47 Indeed, such a common interest in
higher prices exists in all price fixing cartels.48
A potentially confusing part of the single entity analysis as
applied to the drivers’ agreement relates to the dispute over whether
the drivers are employees of the platform company. Generally,
employees are considered part of a single entity with the employer.49
Therefore, one might think that the question of whether drivers are
employees of Uber would control the single entity question. However,
that is not the case. Employees are considered part of the same entity
as the employer only when they are pursuing the employer’s interest.50
This is why the labor exemption is so important for employees who
belong to a union.51 Without an exemption, their collective demands for
higher pay, which are not in pursuit of the employer’s interest, would
merely be an illegal cartel.52
44.
Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 888–89.
45.
See id. at 900.
46.
Anderson, supra note 20, at 527–34.
47.
Id. at 537.
48.
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 201–02 (2010).
49.
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984).
50.
See id. at 769 n.15; see also 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW ¶ 1471 (3d ed. 2010).
51.
See infra Section II.B.
52.
1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 255 (4th ed. 2013).
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2. Joint Negotiations and Surge Price Manipulation Reflect Horizontal
Agreements Among Drivers
If separate economic actors exist, the second step in analyzing
the agreement element asks whether those actors have coordinated
their conduct. Sometimes this question is easy to answer. Actors
sometimes meet, talk to each other, and enter into express agreements.
This is true when firms enter into distribution agreements,53 joint
venture agreements,54 or form trade associations.55 Similarly, cartelists
enter into express agreements fixing prices. However, sometimes actors
are alleged to have horizontally coordinated their behavior without
express horizontal agreement. In Interstate Circuit v. United States,56
the Supreme Court determined that a communicated agreement among
horizontal competitors was not necessary for finding an agreement
under Section 1. The Court relied on the coordination of horizontal
conduct through a “hub” oriented vertically to the competitors, creating
a hub-and-spoke agreement that existed despite the lack of express
agreement among individual competitors.57 However, the Interstate
Circuit rule is narrow. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court held
that mere interdependent parallel conduct, in the absence of allegations
of a hub coordinating the horizontal activity and creating implicit
mutual understandings among the horizontal competitors, was not
sufficient for an agreement under Section 1.58
If drivers communicate with each other in order to bargain
collectively over the terms of their relationship with the platform
companies, whether coordination is through express coordination
among drivers or through a hub—perhaps a single representative, or
a communication app59—this collective decision will constitute an
agreement under Section 1. They will have expressed their commitment
to each other that they will coordinate their conduct in jointly
negotiating with the platform company. Their behavior is not merely
consciously parallel. It is the product of a communicated agreement.60
53.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 883 (2007).
54.
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 4 (2006).
55.
Maple Flooring Mfrs.’ Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 565 (1925).
56.
Interstate Cir. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
57.
Id. at 226–27 (identifying a hub-and-spoke agreement as sufficient to represent a
horizontal agreement, despite a lack of allegations of communications between horizontal
competitors). The Authors analyze the hub-and-spoke nature of the sharing economy enterprise
agreement in Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 900–07.
58.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–54 (2007).
59.
See, e.g., supra note 12.
60.
See William H. Page, Facilitating Practices and Concerted Action Under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, in ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS 23, 29–30 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2010).
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Other species of actual or alleged coordination would be treated
similarly. The May 8, 2019, “work stoppage” or “drivers’ strike”61
represented collective action by drivers reached by agreement. Reports
of surge price manipulation, which is believed to have been widespread
in localized markets, also would reflect express agreements among
drivers to game the pricing algorithm.62
If an agreement exists for purposes of Section 1, what is the
nature of that agreement? This question of characterization will be
important for purposes of determining whether the agreement is per se
illegal and, if not, determining how it will be assessed under the Rule
of Reason.63 The agreement to jointly negotiate with the platform
company includes a commitment to accept the price and other
terms that the negotiations produce. The drivers might authorize
representatives to agree with the platform company on their behalf.
Alternatively, the drivers might have a vote to accept the negotiated
terms. Either way, a communicated agreement among the drivers is
present.
3. Is a Suppliers’ Agreement Per Se Illegal?
If an agreement among separate economic actors is found, the
competitive effects of that agreement would be assessed under the
second element of the Section 1 claim.64 Some agreements are subject
to rules of per se illegality, condemned without any consideration of
possible beneficial effects from the conduct.65 In 1940, the Supreme
Court adopted a per se rule for price fixing by competitors.66 In 1972,
the Court applied a per se rule to agreements among competitors
allocating customers.67 Over several decades the Court has discussed

61.
See supra note 12.
62.
Siegal, supra note 11. One description of a changed surge-pricing algorithm may
reduce the incentive to engage in manipulation and could possibly explain the lack of recent reports
of the conduct. Aaron Gordon & Dhruv Mehrotra, We Think Uber and Lyft’s New Surge Fares
Screw Drivers and Riders. Help Us Prove It, JALOPNIK (July 1, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://jalopnik.com/
we-think-uber-and-lyfts-new-surge-fares-screw-drivers-a-1835952856
[https://perma.cc/5HA9DQLJ].
63.
See infra Sections II.A.3, II.A.4.
64.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (stating that an agreement must reflect a “restraint of trade”).
65.
See 2 WILLIAM H. PAGE, JOHN E. LOPATKA & MAX HUFFMAN, KINTNER’S FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW §§ 9.5, 9.6 (2013 & Supp. 2020).
66.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
67.
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (“One of the classic
examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between competitors at the same level of the
market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition.”).
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the potential for applying a per se rule to boycotts.68 The Supreme Court
has also overturned various per se rules.69 Whenever the law adopts a
categorical rule, like a rule of per se illegality, it must determine the
boundaries of the forbidden category. For example, the Supreme Court
spent decades adjusting the boundaries of the per se rule against price
fixing by competitors.70 Likewise, defining the boundaries of conduct
demonstrating a per se illegal group boycott remains challenging.71
Analysis of the application of these rules in the context of joint action
by sharing workers requires a determination of the parameters of the
per se rules.
The per se rule most likely to apply to an agreement among
workers is the rule against price fixing by competitors.72 The
parameters of the rule have been frequently litigated. At its simplest,
price fixing is easy to identify, but as the following paragraphs show,

68.
Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (“Group boycotts,
or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the
forbidden category.”); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 290 (1985) (“This Court has long held that certain concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts
are so likely to restrict competition without any offsetting efficiency gains that they should be
condemned as per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447, 458 (1986) (“[T]he category of restraints classed as group boycotts is not to be expanded
indiscriminately, and the per se approach has generally been limited to cases in which firms with
market power boycott suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from doing business with
a competitor”); FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) (“Moreover, while
the per se rule against price fixing and boycotts is indeed justified in part by ‘administrative
convenience,’ the Court of Appeals erred in describing the prohibition as justified only by such
concerns. The per se rules also reflect a longstanding judgment that the prohibited practices by
their nature have ‘a substantial potential for impact on competition.’”).
69.
See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (minimum resale price
maintenance subject to the Rule of Reason); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), overruled
by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (maximum resale price maintenance subject to the Rule
of Reason); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont’l T. V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical non-price restrictions subject to the Rule of
Reason).
70.
Compare United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940), with
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18–22 (1979), and Arizona v. Maricopa
Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351–56 (1982).
71.
See Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 432–36 (holding per se illegal group
boycott although effect was vertical in nature); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135
(1998) (holding no application of the per se rule to a boycott in the absence of a horizontal
agreement).
72.
The rule against group boycotts is frequently applied to horizontal agreements that
are aimed at competitors or someone party to the agreement. Compare Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476
U.S. at 458–59, with Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 432–36. The victims of the drivers’
agreement are the platform companies, and possibly the riders, neither of whom are competitors
of the drivers. Therefore, the victims of the drivers’ agreement are not competitors of the drivers
and the per se rule against boycotts would not apply.
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the Supreme Court has both applied the rule when the challenged
agreement did not involve a literal price fix and has declined to apply
the rule when the challenged agreement did involve a literal price
fix.73 In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,74 the defendant oil
companies agreed to engage in coordinated purchases of oil in the spot
market in an effort to raise the market price.75 The Court condemned
the agreement as a per se violation of Section 1 in the classic statement
of the rule: “[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce
is illegal per se.”76 Thus, the per se rule against price fixing derives from
a case in which the defendants did not fix a literal price. Consistent
with this broad approach, the Court condemned as per se illegal price
fixing an agreement among competitors to refuse to sell on credit.77
The per se rule against horizontal group boycotts has substantial
overlaps with price fixing, as the boycott can serve as an enforcement
mechanism to support the price fix. The clearest analogy to a potential
drivers’ agreement is a group boycott case involving individual
attorneys practicing in the same courthouse in Washington, DC called
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n.78 Specifically, this case
significantly parallels a horizontal agreement among drivers designed
to improve their bargaining position with the platform. In Superior
Court Trial Lawyers, the defendants were lawyers who provided
indigent criminal defense services by court appointment in the District
of Columbia.79 The government paid the court-appointed counsel by the
hour. Members of the association formed a strike committee and
ultimately voted to refuse to take any more court appointments until
the hourly rates were raised.80 This refusal resulted in substantial
difficulty in the administration of justice and the District ultimately
raised the hourly rates, bringing the strike to an end.81

73.
Cf. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222–23 (applying price fixing rule to
agreement better classified as market manipulation); Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at
432–36 (declining to treat a price fix among lawyers as such, instead classifying it as a group
boycott).
74.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150.
75.
Id. at 167–68.
76.
Id. at 223.
77.
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648 (1980) (per curiam).
78.
Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 432–36.
79.
Id. at 415.
80.
Id. at 416–17.
81.
Id. at 417–18.
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The Supreme Court held that the strike constituted a per se
illegal boycott.82 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred
in part and dissented in part critiquing the boycott rationale.83 The
majority responded to the criticism by noting that the defendants’
conduct included not only a refusal to deal but also price fixing by
competitors.84 How does Superior Court Trial Lawyers help to analyze
the drivers’ agreement? The lawyers’ purpose in entering into their
agreement was to take a joint position regarding price. This purpose
was dispositive and led to the application of the per se rule. The drivers,
of course, have a purpose to affect the price, and their agreement to
achieve that purpose would be per se illegal under Superior Court Trial
Lawyers.85
Despite the substantial parallels to these authorities applying
the per se rule, the Section 1 analysis is complicated by a number of
cases in which the Supreme Court has declined to apply the per se rule
to agreements among competitors that were intended to affect the
market price. In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, the defendants had agreed that they would not engage in
competitive bidding.86 The Court viewed the agreement as aimed at
maintaining prices.87 Nevertheless, the Court declined to apply the per
se rule, nominally applying the Rule of Reason.88 In NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the defendant universities had
limited the number of football games that could be broadcast on
82.
Id. at 432. The Court’s conclusion that the agreement among the lawyers was a per se
illegal boycott is in tension with Indiana Federation of Dentists, which declined to apply the per se
rule against boycotts because the victim of the boycott was not a competitor of anyone party to the
agreement. 476 U.S. 447, 457–58 (1986).
83.
Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 452 n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
84.
Id. at 436 n.19 (majority opinion) (“In response to Justice BRENNAN’s opinion, and
particularly to its observation that some concerted arrangements that might be characterized as
‘group boycotts’ may not merit per se condemnation, see post, at 790–791, n. 9, we emphasize that
this case involves not only a boycott but also a horizontal price-fixing arrangement—a type of
conspiracy that has been consistently analyzed as a per se violation for many decades. All of the
‘group boycott’ cases cited in Justice BRENNAN’s footnote involved nonprice restraints. There was
likewise no price-fixing component in any of the boycotts listed on pages 787–788 of Justice
BRENNAN’s opinion. Indeed, the text of the opinion virtually ignores the price-fixing component
of respondents’ concerted action.”).
85.
See 2 PAGE ET AL., supra note 65, §§ 9.5, 9.6.
86.
Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 683 (1978).
87.
Id. at 693 (footnote omitted) (“The Society argues that the restraint is justified because
bidding on engineering services is inherently imprecise, would lead to deceptively low bids, and
would thereby tempt individual engineers to do inferior work with consequent risk to public safety
and health. The logic of this argument rests on the assumption that the agreement will tend to
maintain the price level; if it had no such effect, it would not serve its intended purpose.”).
88.
Id. at 696.
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television and put a price on the broadcast rights for the games.89
Despite acknowledging that the agreement looked like per se illegal
price fixing, the Court decided to apply the Rule of Reason because “this
case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition
are essential if the product is to be available at all.”90 The best
explanation for the holdings in Professional Engineers and Board of
Regents is the Supreme Court’s discomfort with applying the per se rule
to more complex business structures, including professions and sports
leagues, for which unrestrained competition might be inconsistent with
providing the product at all.91 This reticence might provide a basis for
an argument on behalf of the drivers that the per se rule against price
fixing does not apply to their conduct.
The US Chamber of Commerce sued the city of Seattle in 2017,
challenging an ordinance providing for collective bargaining by
ride-sharing drivers. The Chamber won a preliminary injunction and,
on appeal, succeeded in the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
against a state-action immunity argument. The Chamber alleged price
fixing in violation of Section 1.92 While the case was on remand, the city
of Seattle amended its ordinance to remove the provisions allowing
collective bargaining about price, causing the Chamber to dismiss its
Sherman Act claims.93
In summary, there are strong arguments that the drivers’ strike
is per se illegal as price fixing and a group boycott by competitors under
existing Supreme Court authority. Parts III and IV argue that this
authority fails to take into account significant economic aspects of the
drivers’ relationship with the platform companies and consumers.
4. Joint Action by Sharing Economy Workers Would Be Condemned
Under the Rule of Reason as Currently Applied
Under the current Section 1 doctrine, most agreements are
assessed under the Rule of Reason, rather than deemed per se illegal.94
Originating in Judge Taft’s opinion in United States v. Addyston
89.
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 91–93 (1984).
90.
Id. at 101.
91.
Cf. HYLTON, supra note 38, at 125–29 (discussing Professional Engineers and Board
of Regents as reflecting “[p]ressure on [the] Rule of Reason [b]oundary”).
92.
Complaint at 17, Chamber of Com. v. City of Seattle, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (W.D.
Wash. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00370-RSL) (first citing FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S.
411, 422 (1990); then citing FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457–58 (1986); and then
citing Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 693–95).
93.
Stipulation and Order for Dismissal Without Prejudice, Chamber of Com. v. City of
Seattle, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00370-RSL).
94.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007).
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Pipe & Steel Co.95 and most clearly explained by Justice Brandeis in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,96 the Rule of Reason treats
agreements that regulate competition, thereby promoting rather than
suppressing competition, through an evaluation of the effects of those
agreements.97 Courts have provided a structured approach to the Rule
of Reason by separating the analysis into a series of questions and
allocating burdens to the plaintiff and defendant on each question,
reflecting both the parties’ respective access to evidence and the danger
of false positive or false negative results. The threshold question is
whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of the likelihood
that the agreement has an anticompetitive effect. For example, in
Professional Engineers,98 the Court concluded that an agreement
among the members of an association of engineers to refrain from
competitive bidding posed sufficient anticompetitive potential to meet
this threshold.99 Similarly, in Board of Regents,100 the Court held that
an agreement among universities to limit the number of football games
broadcast on television and pricing the games that were broadcast met
the threshold.101 In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,102 the Court
reached the same conclusion regarding an agreement among dentists
to refuse to supply x-rays to insurance companies.103
In each of these cases, the Court permitted the case to proceed
under the Rule of Reason without requiring the plaintiff to engage in a
sophisticated analysis of the market and the likely competitive effects
of the conduct.104 This approach is sometimes characterized as a “quick
look” version of the Rule of Reason.105 The Court has not always been
willing to apply this quick look approach. In California Dental Ass’n v.
FTC,106 the Court declined to apply this approach to an agreement

95.
See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
96.
See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
97.
See id. at 238–39; see also 2 PAGE ET AL., supra note 65, §§ 9.5–9.7.
98.
Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
99.
Id. at 692.
100.
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
101.
Id. at 113.
102.
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
103.
Id. at 459.
104.
See Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 693–96 (rejecting purported efficiency
justification as non-cognizable); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 113–20 (considering
but not accepting purported efficiency justifications).
105.
See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 914–16 (arguing for application of the quick
look to the Uber pricing algorithm); 2 PAGE ET AL., supra note 65, § 9.7.
106.
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
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among dentists that limited the type of advertising by dentists.107
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, determined that the Commission
had not presented enough evidence of the likelihood of anticompetitive
effects to meet the threshold question under the Rule of Reason.108
If a plaintiff meets the initial burden of presenting sufficient
evidence of the likelihood of anticompetitive effects of an agreement, the
burden shifts to the defendant to offer evidence of a procompetitive
justification for the agreement.109 To be considered, the justification
must serve the goal of enhancing competition. In Professional
Engineers, the Court rejected the defendants’ attempt to justify a ban
on competitive bidding based on the assertion that bidding would lead
to poor-quality engineering. The Court held that “[t]he Rule of Reason
does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition
itself is unreasonable.”110 Similarly, in Indiana Federation of Dentists,
the Court rejected the defendants’ attempt to justify an agreement to
refuse to supply insurance companies with x-rays by asserting that
doing so would be bad for patients.111 The Court characterized the
argument as an attack on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.112 If the
defendant makes an adequate showing of a procompetitive justification,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the anticompetitive
effects outweigh the procompetitive effects.113 Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar also treated an agreement not to lower the price for a particular
form of legal services as price fixing and subjected it to the per se rule.114
The quick look approach to the initial question of the likelihood
of anticompetitive effects is likely applying the Rule of Reason to a
drivers’ agreement under current authority. Assuming the goal of the
drivers’ agreement is to raise driver compensation, whether in
107.
Id. at 778.
108.
Id. at 775–76; see also Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick
Look but Not the Full Monty, 67 A NTITRUST L.J. 495, 504 (2000). Justice Breyer’s dissent in
California Dental Ass’n argued that the obviousness of the competitive harm from the agreement
should have served to shift the burden to the defendant. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 784–85
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
109.
Whether this burden is one of persuasion or mere production of evidence is addressed
below. See infra Section IV.B.
110.
Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
111.
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986).
112.
Id.
113.
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 103–04 (2018).
114.
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). There is an interesting question to
what degree these cases involving learned professions, which frequently involve individuals
providing services somewhat autonomously (either as solo practitioners or as employees with
ethical obligations to exercise independent judgment), are good analogs to the ride-sharing market.
Many of the rationales for individual autonomy for professionals might apply with similar force to
workers in a ride-sharing enterprise.
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monetary terms or in terms of a requirement of nonmonetary benefits,
a plaintiff challenging the drivers’ agreement would be able to quickly
demonstrate the likelihood of anticompetitive effects—an increase in
the price of services provided and commensurate reduction in the
quantity demanded. Because of the clear impact on price and output
from such an agreement, the dissent by Justice Breyer in California
Dental—rather than the majority opinion by Justice Souter—is likely
to control the decision of the applicable standard.115
Under existing authority, there do not seem to be any
procompetitive justifications for a strike, collective bargaining, or any
other horizontal agreement designed to raise worker pay in a
ride-sharing enterprise. Workers’ earnings from providing ride-sharing
services are a function of competition among them, which likely impacts
their compensation in two ways. First, the willingness of workers to
drive in a ride-sharing enterprise reduces the platform’s need to offer
generous terms as part of the driver agreement. Second, in day-to-day
driving, competitive entry (turning on the app) leads to lower revenues
per ride given. But, consistent with Professional Engineers, Indiana
Federation of Dentists, and Goldfarb, unhappiness with the results of
competition is not a cognizable justification for an agreement not to
compete.116 In the absence of a procompetitive justification, an
agreement among the workers would be condemned under the current
Rule of Reason authority.
Current Sherman Act authority would deny the drivers the
protection of the single entity rule and find a horizontal agreement
among the drivers. The most likely treatment of such an agreement is
under the inflexible per se rule, resulting in automatic illegality. Even
if not per se illegal, existing authority would condemn the agreement
under a quick look version of the Rule of Reason. Part IV recommends
an evolution of doctrine that would subject negotiation by the drivers to
the Rule of Reason and open the possibility of it being permitted under
prescribed circumstances in which it produced outcomes that, on net,
benefitted consumers.117

115.
See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 784–86 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
HYLTON, supra note 38, at 128–29; Calkins, supra note 108, at 504–05.
116.
See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
117.
Surge price manipulation would remain per se illegal under the Author’s approach.
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B. Intersection of Labor and Employment Law with Antitrust
Principles
Taken to its literal extreme, the prohibition of restraints on
trade in Section 1 of the Sherman Act produces untenable results,
preventing the coordination of entrepreneurship with capital, the
aggregation of capital, agreements that on their own might be harmful
but are necessary to support beneficial agreements, among other
examples.118 As a result, both at common law and soon after the
enactment of the Sherman Act, courts recognized the necessity of
interpreting the prohibitions of restraints to apply only to unreasonable
restraints.119 The “reasonableness” limitation—the basis for the Rule of
Reason in antitrust—has a labor exemption at its core. In the examples
of reasonable restraints that then-Judge William Howard Taft outlined
in Addyston Pipe & Steel, several spoke to combinations of workers (for
example, in a partnership) or agreements among small entrepreneurs
(for example, a noncompete agreement in the sale of a business) that
restrain competition in the labor market.120 Judge Taft drew these
examples from common law authorities, some long predating the
Sherman Act.121
However, consistent with the principles outlined in the prior
Section, early applications of the Sherman Act in labor markets treated
labor-organizing conduct as a wage-fixing cartel, with employers the
direct victims.122 The labor exemption, a partially statutory, partially
common-law carve-out for union organizing by employees, gave legal
sanction to certain exercises of labor market power without regard to
the effect on consumers.123 This exemption developed as a preference
for social policy favoring labor interests over competing consumer
interests.124 This Section outlines the development of non-antitrust
labor policy as applied to ride-sharing enterprises before analyzing the
labor exemption in the ride-sharing context.

118.
Any such coordination both prevents competition between the parties and prevents
each of the parties from cooperating with others—each of which represents a restraint that read
literally would be prohibited by the Sherman Act.
119.
See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at 279–82.
122.
See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 304–09 (1908) (overruling demurrer entered
for defendant United Hatters of North America in a suit by plaintiff manufacturers of hats).
123.
See infra Section II.B.2.
124.
See generally 9 EARL W. KINTNER, JOSEPH BAUER & WILLIAM PAGE, KINTNER’S
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 72.1 (1989 & Supp. 2020).
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1. Labor and Employment Law Treatment of Ride-Sharing
Enterprises
A substantial body of law has developed, challenging
ride-sharing enterprises’ efforts to designate drivers as independent
contractors, thus avoiding employment law protections that would
apply if employee status was proved. These cases primarily reflect
efforts by ride-sharing drivers, or their purported representatives, to be
treated as employees rather than independent contractors for purposes
of legal protections and benefits.125 Both federal and state law
protections are available to employees but not to contractors.126 The
employment status of workers in ride-sharing enterprises bears an
important relationship to the antitrust consequences of organizing by
these workers for collective bargaining purposes.127
The employment question requires courts to distinguish
between an “employee” and an “independent contractor.”128 In its

125.
See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (class
representing Uber drivers seeking treatment as employees).
126.
See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230, at *19–20
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018) (citing Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 206–207), vacated, 951
F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2020); id. at *20 (noting that Pennsylvania’s Minimum Wage Act looks to Federal
law for the definition of employee).
127.
See infra Section II.B.2, Part III.
128.
See Fact Sheet 13: Employment Relationship Under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. 1 (July 2008) [hereinafter Fact Sheet 13], https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/whdfs13.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZ57-M5DS]. The distinction between
employee and contractor is old. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728–29 (1947)
(quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)) (noting the “broad” definition
of employ, with its genesis in child-labor statutes, that was “not so broad as to include those ‘who,
without any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on
the premises of another’”). The modern statement of the employee-contractor distinction is fact
dependent, turning on application of a multifactor test broadly recognized by the courts and
the Department of Labor. See Fact Sheet 13, supra, at 1. The Third Circuit’s representative
formulation of the test, applied by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Razak v. Uber, requires
a court to consider:
(1)

the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner in which the work
is to be performed;

(2)

the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his
managerial skill;

(3)

the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his task,
or his employment of helpers;

(4)

whether the service rendered requires a special skill;

(5)

the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and

(6)

whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business.

Razak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230, at *21 (citing Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d
1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985)). The US Department of Labor has recently followed a seven-factor test,
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now-withdrawn April 2019 opinion letter, the Department of Labor’s
Wage and Hour Division stated a variation of the several-factor control
test.129 And state laws on the question are similar. California law,
interpreted in O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, notes the preeminence of
“control” but also considers “several ‘secondary’ indicia” including:
(a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without
supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the
principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work
for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services are to be
performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) whether
or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (h) whether or
not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.130

In O’Connor, a putative class of Uber drivers sued Uber,
contending the plaintiffs were employees, not independent contractors,
and thus were entitled to legal protections including full pass-through
of gratuities.131 On an application of the “control plus” test from
California law, the O’Connor court determined that ride-sharing
drivers were presumptively employees and refused Uber’s motion for
summary judgment.132 Comparable cases have been brought on both US
coasts and against both Uber and Lyft,133 seeking protections including

which tracks the judicial formulae, in applying its own definition of employee. See Fact Sheet 13,
supra, at 1. According to the DOL:
[a]n employee, as distinguished from a person who is engaged in business for himself
or herself, is one who, as a matter of economic reality, follows the usual path of an
employee and is dependent upon the business to which he or she renders service. The
employer-employee relationship under the FLSA is tested by economic reality rather
than technical concepts. It is not determined by common law standards relating to
master and servant.
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (Sept. 5, 2002), 2002 WL 32406602, at *2.
Under that test, the DOL applies seven factors that substantially mirror the six factors from
Razak. See Fact Sheet 13, supra, at 1.
129.
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (Apr. 29, 2019), 2019 WL
1977301, at *4 (withdrawn Feb. 19, 2021). The Federal employee-contractor distinction is in
flux as of this publication. See Independent Contractor Status Under the Fair Labor Standards
Act: Delay of Effective Date, 86 Fed. Reg. 8326 (Feb. 5, 2021).
130.
S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 48 Cal. 3d 341, 350–51 (1989) (cited
in O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1138).
131.
O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135, 1137–38. Both federal- and state-law protections
turn on the common law employer-contractor distinction. See id. at 1138–40.
132.
See id. at 1135, 1138–40 (California, putative class action against Uber).
133.
See Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 284, 288 (D. Mass. 2016) (Massachusetts,
putative class action against Lyft); Razak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230, at *2, *8 (Pennsylvania,
putative class action against Uber).
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minimum wages and overtime pay,134 and coverage of vehicle
maintenance, ownership, and insurance expenses.135 Despite such
favorable reception in some courts, ride-sharing drivers have uniformly
failed to achieve successful outcomes in lawsuits seeking treatment as
employees for purposes of wage-and-hour and benefits obligations. In
several cases, including O’Connor, the drivers have been subjected
to mandatory arbitration provisions in their contracts with the
platforms.136 In others, courts have granted summary judgment to Uber
on the question of employee status.137
For a short period, California served as a substantial exception
to this trend, with a state-law amendment classifying sharing economy
workers as employees more readily than at common law or under
federal law.138 California’s “gig-economy bill” took effect in January
2020 and responded to the perceived “misclassification of workers as
independent contractors.”139 It placed the burden on the “hiring entity”
to show (1) freedom from control and direction, (2) work performed
outside the hiring entity’s usual business, and (3) the person is
customarily engaged in independently established trade of the same
nature.140 It would be difficult for a ride-sharing platform to
demonstrate the third element in particular. In a lawsuit by the
California attorney general to enforce AB-5, a trial court preliminarily
enjoined Uber and Lyft to reclassify ride-sharing drivers as employees,
relying instead on the second element of the statutory test.141 The
preliminary injunction was stayed on appeal.142 However, in November
134.
See Razak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230, at *2, *19 (“Plaintiffs contend that they are
‘employees’ under the FLSA, and therefore entitled to overtime pay and other benefits”).
135.
See Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 289 (“The complaint alleges that . . . drivers must pay
for expenses that their employer Lyft should pay for, including costs of vehicle ownership and
maintenance, gas, and insurance.”).
136.
See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing
the district court’s refusal to compel arbitration).
137.
See Razak, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61230, at *3.
138.
See Assemb. B. 5, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
139.
Id. § 1.
140.
Id. § 2. These elements were initially stated by the California Supreme Court in
Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 42 (Cal. 2018).
141.
People v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-20-584402, 2020 WL 5440308, *3, *18 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2020) (issuing a preliminary injunction because “[d]efendants’ drivers do not
perform work that is ‘outside the usual course’ of their businesses”), aff’d, 270 Cal. Rptr. 3d 290
(Ct. App. 2020).
142.
Kate Conger, Uber and Lyft Get Reprieve After Threatening to Shut Down, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/technology/uber-lyft-california-shutdown.html [https://perma.cc/A627-TU4V]. Scholarly commentary largely condemns the outcomes
dismissing cases that seek to classify drivers as employees, as leading to irredeemable
bargaining-power disparities between centralized employers and highly diffuse independent
contractors. See, e.g., Hiba Hafiz, Picketing in the New Economy, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1851,
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2020, California voters broadly supported an Uber and Lyft-sponsored
proposition, Proposition 22, which reversed the impact of AB-5.
Proposition 22 declared app-based drivers as independent contractors,
so long as the platform (called “network company” in the terms of
Proposition 22) did not establish a work schedule or minimum hours
requirement, did not require the driver to accept a ride request, did not
restrict driving with competing services, and did not restrict engaging
in other employment.143
Both federal and state law broadly treat ride-share drivers
as contractors, rather than employees. Efforts have been made to
change that definition, both through increasingly broad definitions of
“employment” in court and legislative change in California.144 Those
efforts have not succeeded, in one case due to a popular referendum
reversing an attempted legislative change in California. Next, this
Article approaches the interplay between labor law and antitrust law
from the antitrust perspective. The next Subsection demonstrates that
the labor law exemption from antitrust cannot be relied on to protect
workers in a ride-sharing enterprise against liability from likely illegal
coordinated activity.
2. Labor Exemption from Antitrust
The labor market is, on the one hand, merely an upstream
market for inputs into the production process no different from a
market for raw materials, capital, or any other factor of production.
Such a reductive explanation of labor markets might justify subjecting
1886–89 (2018) (calling for increased picketing options to mitigate bargaining disparity). In a
potent critique of the bargaining-power disparities facing workers in a “fissured business
arrangement,” Professor Paul identifies an inconsistency between treatment of a ride-sharing firm
as an application company supplying an input to individual service providers, for purposes of labor
law; as a disruptive force in a stagnant industry, for purposes of escaping regulatory oversight;
and as a centralized enterprise, for purposes of escaping antitrust liability. See Sanjukta Paul,
Fissuring and the Firm Exemption, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 66, 72–74 (2019). Paul sees a
historic symmetry between the single entity exemption and the labor exemption to liability for
coordinated activity under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See id. at 67, 72. She suggests that if one
gives way—for example, the workers in a ride-sharing enterprise are treated as independent
contractors—the other should as well, potentially subjecting the ride-sharing enterprise to price
fixing and related liability. See id. at 85–86. Professor Paul’s symmetry is elegant, though it
appears unsupported by case law or commentary. Nonetheless, the Authors’ argument in this
Article is not in real tension with Professor Paul’s approach. See infra Section IV.B.
143.
California Proposition 22, App-Based Drivers as Contractors and Labor Policies
Initiative (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_22,_App-Based_
Drivers_as_Contractors_and_Labor_Policies_Initiative_(2020)
[https://perma.cc/J7NE-8XH7]
(last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
144.
See supra notes 125–26, 131–34; see also Assemb. B. 5, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2019).
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labor organization to the same antitrust prohibitions that are applied
to product markets. This is a fair summary of the judicial treatment of
labor strikes throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
For example, in People v. Fisher, a state court interpreted a statute
prohibiting conspiracies “[t]o commit any act injurious . . . to trade or
commerce” to apply to a strike of cobblers in Geneva, New York.145 The
Fisher court explained the economic effect of such a labor organization:
If journeymen bootmakers, by extravagant demands for wages, so enhance the price
of boots made in Geneva, for instance, that boots made elsewhere, in Auburn, for
example, can be sold cheaper, is not such an act injurious to trade? It is surely so to
the trade of Geneva in that particular article, and that I apprehend is all that is
necessary to bring the offense within the statute.146

But labor differs from other inputs in important ways. First,
labor may be locked into relationships with one employer or a small
number of employers due to specialized investment, education,
training, and experience that does not have value outside of the
particular industry. Having made that investment, or acquired that
education, training, or experience, an individual supplier of labor loses
bargaining power vis-à-vis the firm. In a ride-sharing market, an
example is an Uber driver who purchased a vehicle specifically for her
sole proprietorship driving in the Uber enterprise—what is dubbed in
this Article as the lock-in model. Second, the labor force, like the
population of consumers, is highly diffuse.147 In the absence of
coordination, individual workers face a horizontal demand curve for
their services just as any supplier in perfect competition does. Atomistic
supply is a definitional feature of sharing economy enterprises and
certainly characterizes ride-sharing enterprises.148
In this way, labor markets are the mirror image of markets for
the sale of products to consumers, although there is another
aggravating factor unique to input markets: consumers can frequently
opt not to participate because few consumer transactions reflect

145.
People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9, 12, 14–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) (quoting 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat.
691, § 8 (1829)).
146.
Id. at 17–18.
147.
See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 863. These two features aggregate to the
benefit of the buyer of labor and to the detriment of the seller. See Warren S. Grimes, Buyer Power
and Retail Gatekeeper Power: Protecting Competition and the Atomistic Seller, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
563, 566–69 (2005). While on the one hand the specialized training and experience might impact
both sides of the transaction equally (replacing a worker’s experience is as difficult as the worker
finding an alternate use for that experience), the atomistic nature of the labor market ensures an
alternate source of supply for the buyer of labor. See id.
148.
See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 883.
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necessities.149 Workers less frequently have the option of declining to
participate in the market because employment is essential to a large
portion of the workforce.150 Labor markets thus exhibit bargaining
disparities that may lead to underpricing labor inputs relative to
arms-length transactions, perhaps even to a greater degree than
consumer markets may experience overpricing.151
Analyses of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the
original and primary US antitrust statute, suggest that the statute was
not meant to cover activity by labor unions.152 Nonetheless, early
challengers to labor organizing using antitrust laws interpreted Section
1 of the Sherman Act to apply to and prohibit some activities by
organized labor. In 1908, the Supreme Court held in Loewe v. Lawlor
that a nationwide scheme of boycotts meant to facilitate the
unionization of manufacturers of fur hats constituted a conspiracy in
violation of Section 1.153
Congress responded in 1914 with the Clayton Act, adding two
sections meant to reverse the outcomes in cases like Loewe. In Section

149.
See Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor
Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 538 (2018). This reality is depicted graphically with a
downward-sloping demand curve, with a less steep slope indicating easier opt-out for consumers.
150.
The labor market supply curve reflecting this reality would be a steeply sloping curve,
indicating the supply will remain static even as wages are reduced.
151.
See Naidu et al., supra note 149, at 546–47. The characteristics described here are not
unique to labor markets. See id. at 538–39. They arise in any market where one side of the
transaction has greater market power than the other, which is frequently the case when one side
supplies a commodity input (product or service) and the other has a specialized use for that input.
See id. In other such cases, exceptions to the antitrust laws may exist to allow collective action to
correct for the bargaining disparity. See Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for
Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1559 (2018). An example
is the Capper-Volstead Act, which since 1922 has given a limited exemption for agricultural
marketing associations. See Capper-Volstead Act, ch. 57, § 1, 42 Stat. 388, 388 (1922) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 291).
152.
See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 676, 700–01 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring and dissenting) (“[A] careful reading of the legislative history shows that the
interdiction of ‘every’ contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade was not intended to
apply to labor unions and the activities of labor unions in their own interests, aimed at promotion
of the labor conditions of their members.”). Much of the discussion in this Section draws from the
treatise, 9 KINTNER ET AL., supra note 124, § 72.
153.
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 304, 306–09 (1908) (holding that the motion to dismiss
(demurrer) should have been overruled based on the facts alleged). In one of the earliest cases,
United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 F. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893), the Federal
Circuit Court in New Orleans held that allegations of a warehouseman’s strike with substantial
impact on trade through the port of New Orleans stated a claim under the Sherman Act. Id. at
999–1000. The court recognized that the concerns leading to the Sherman Act spoke to industrial
combinations rather than labor organization, but held that the broad language of the statute as
enacted covered labor activity as well. Id. at 996.
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6 of the Clayton Act,154 Congress sought to define labor organization out
of the Sherman Act prohibitions: “[t]he labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce,” language that on its face seems to
preclude the application of the Sherman Act, which prohibits conduct
with regard to “trade or commerce.”155 In Section 20 of the Clayton
Act,156 Congress prohibited the use of the remedy of injunction in the
context of labor disputes.
Supreme Court authorities throughout the second and third
decades of the twentieth century frustrated “[t]hese Congressional
provisions,”157 narrowly reading Section 6 to apply only if labor
organizations held to “normal and legitimate objects.”158 But beginning
in the 1930s, Congress and a changed Supreme Court breathed new life
into an exemption from antitrust for labor organizations.159
The modern labor exemption developed in two parallel and
occasionally intersecting lines of authority—one, the congressional
enactments and case law establishing the “statutory exemption,”
and the other, a series of cases constituting the “non-statutory
exemption.”160 More recent case law has established three requirements
for the statutory exemption: (1) conduct of the union in the course of a
labor dispute; (2) the union acting in its own self-interest; and (3) the
union acting unilaterally and not in combination with nonunions.161
154.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 17). 15 U.S.C. § 17 reads in full:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation
of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of
mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the
legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held
or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws.
Id.
155.
See id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2. Courts had long interpreted “trade” and “commerce” as
functional synonyms. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 55 F. 605, 639 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893)
(interpreting Sherman Act, Section 1).
156.
§ 20, 38 Stat. at 738 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52).
157.
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 702 (Goldberg, J., concurring and dissenting).
158.
Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921).
159.
Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 101–15); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 227–28, 231 (1941). (“Therefore,
whether trade union conduct constitutes a violation of the Sherman Law is to be determined only
by reading the Sherman Law and § 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a
harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct.”).
160.
See generally 9 KINTNER ET AL., supra note 124, §§ 72.3, 72.7.
161.
Id. § 72.3; H. A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704, 714–15 (1981)
(quoting Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232).

744

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:4:715

The non-statutory labor exemption may immunize conduct even where
the statutory exemption does not apply.162 This doctrine can be
analogized to the Rule of Reason in antitrust, requiring a weighing of
the competitive harm against benefits—the advancement of the public
policy favoring labor organization—and a determination of which policy
overbears the other.163 A holistic read of the cases establishing the
non-statutory exemption renders the doctrine of limited use
inapplicable to labor organization in ride-sharing.
The crux question in the application of the statutory exemption
in the context of sharing economy enterprises is that of the labor
organization or union acting in the course of a labor dispute, which has
led to holdings requiring an employment relationship.164 For example,
the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Conley Motor Express
v. Russell, refused to apply the statutory labor exemption to immunize
picketing by a purported labor union of independent contractor truckers
against the trucking enterprise to which they leased and for
whom they drove their trucks. The court concluded the lack of the
employer-employee relationship prevented the application of the labor
exemption.165
Seemingly conflicting cases leave ambiguity as to whether
employee status definitely determines the application of the exemption.
The Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in Columbia River Packers Ass’n v.
Hinton166 establishes the dominant view that independent contractors
do not have the requisite employment relationship to be eligible for the
exemption. The plaintiff was an owner-operator of canneries in the
Pacific Northwest. The defendants were a union of independent
fishermen, its officers, its members, and two other fish cannery
operations. The Court noted that the union members were independent
162.
See generally 9 KINTNER ET AL., supra note 124, § 72.7; Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 512–13 (1940) (assuming without explanation the inapplicability of the statutory
exemption). In Apex Hosiery, the defendant union had sought to organize plaintiff’s employees and
conducted a violent strike, causing substantial economic harm—conduct the Court compared to
purely tortious or criminal action, such as “a conspiracy to derail and rob an interstate train, even
though it were laden with 100,000 dozen pairs of stockings,” which would not implicate the
antitrust laws despite causing the same economic harm as the strike. Id. at 482–83, 486–87.
163.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.3 (2000), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/
1098461/download [https://perma.cc/BJ8D-SEEA].
164.
See Conley Motor Express, Inc. v. Russell, 500 F.2d 124, 126–27 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing
Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145–47 (1942)) (holding that independent
contractor truckers could not avail themselves of the statutory labor exemption because of the lack
of an employer-employee relationship).
165.
Conley Motor Express, 500 F.2d at 127 (“[A]ppellants have failed to show that the
employer-employee relationship forms the matrix of their controversy with Conley.”).
166.
Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942).
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fishermen, who owned or leased their boats and pursued their work
without oversight or control by the canneries. The fishermen did not
seek employment with the plaintiff cannery operator but instead sought
to collectively impose on the plaintiff a contract term in which the
plaintiff agreed to only purchase fish from union members.
Characterizing this as a “dispute among businessmen over the terms of
a contract for the sale of fish” and not a “controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment, or concerning the association . . . of
persons . . . seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,” the
Court determined the statutory exemption did not apply.167
The fishermen in Columbia River Packers and workers in
a sharing economy enterprise are highly analogous. Both service
providers own the primary capital asset used in their work—whether
boat or car. Both conduct their work with limited or no oversight or
control by the enterprise with which they regularly contract.168 This
close analogy leaves little doubt that, under the current state of the law,
the ambiguity would be resolved against applying the labor exemption
to organization efforts by sharing economy workers. But there is an
important disanalogy that informs the analysis in Part V. In leading
cases treating suppliers as contractors rather than employees, and
therefore refusing to apply the labor exemption, the market in which
the suppliers operate is one for the provision of goods—fish, in
Columbia River Packers, or grease, in L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers
Union, Local 626 v. United States—as opposed to the services at issue
in much of the sharing economy.169
167.
Id. at 144–45 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 113(c)). Courts following Columbia River Packers
have interpreted the holding to prevent independent contractors from taking advantage of the
statutory labor exemption. See H. A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704,
717 & n.20 (1981) (citing Columbia River Packers, 315 U.S. 143) (“Of course, a party seeking refuge
in the statutory exemption must be a bona fide labor organization, and not an independent
contractor or entrepreneur.”). An alternative approach is found in American Federation of
Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968), where the Court considered the case of independent
musicians establishing a set of bylaws and regulations by which they set minimum prices and
other common contract terms for performances. The Court treated the union of musicians and
orchestra leaders as a “labor group,” based on the “presence of a job or wage competition or some
other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests between the union members
and the independent contractors.” Id. at 105–06. The Court found the requisite competition among
the orchestra leaders and other musicians to establish the economic relationship needed for labor
group status. Id. at 109–11.
168.
Compare supra text accompanying notes 148–49, with Anderson & Huffman, supra
note 1, at 884–85 (discussing the structure of the sharing economy enterprise).
169.
L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962)).
L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union involved facts strikingly similar to Columbia River Packers.
Independent “grease peddlers,” working as middlemen in purchasing grease from restaurants and
selling it primarily overseas, joined forces under the auspices of the defendant union to establish
fixed purchase and sale prices for grease “for the purpose of increasing the margin between the
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The next Part turns to an analysis of the economics underlying
ride-sharing labor markets and how that economic story impacts
workers and consumers. This Article reaches somewhat surprising
conclusions that lead to the argument in Part IV for an efficiency
defense for some ride-share-worker organizing.
III. ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING OF ANTITRUST IN LABOR MARKETS
The dominant understanding of antitrust law identifies its
goal as protecting consumers from the effects flowing from limits on
competition, whether by the unilateral exercise of market power or by
concerted conduct.170 However, recent commentary has challenged that
understanding of the goals of antitrust law.171 Such alternate
approaches have not generally been adopted.172 There is some question
as to whether the consumer protection goal is inconsistent with worker
protections. One perspective is that workers and consumers compete
for surplus welfare created by voluntary transactions. Economic theory
supports another perspective, that worker protections increase output
in labor markets, leading to greater output and lower prices in
consumer-facing product markets. This perspective puts both workers
and consumers on the same side of a contest against producers.173 The
first perspective would suggest that worker protections are inconsistent
with antitrust law’s goal of consumer protection. The second perspective
suggests worker protections advance those goals.
prices they paid for grease and the prices at which they sold it to the processors.” Id. at 96–97. The
defendants did not make a showing of “actual or potential wage or job competition, or of any other
economic interrelationship, between the grease peddlers and the other members of the union.” Id.
at 98. The Court noted: “It is also beyond question that nothing in the anti-injunction provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, nor in the labor exemption provisions of the Clayton Act, insulates a
combination in illegal restraint of trade between businessmen and a labor union from the sanctions
of the antitrust laws.” Id. at 99–100 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). A dissent by Justice
Douglas argued that the union had an interest in increasing the profits to the competing
independent grease peddlers. Id. at 110–12 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
170.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Borderline 2, 10–11 (Aug. 11, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3656702; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
107–12 (1978).
171.
See, e.g., STEINBAUM & STUCKE, supra note 31; Wu, supra note 32.
172.
See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Monopsony and the Meaning of
“Consumer Welfare”: A Closer Look at Weyerhauser, Address Before the 2006 Milton Handler
Annual Antitrust Review (Dec. 7, 2006), in 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 353, 359–60 (stating view
that antitrust protects consumer welfare and that challenges to monopsony must be justified by
the effects on consumers).
173.
See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
45–46 (2010) (arguing that a monopsonist buyer of labor faces higher marginal cost of labor than
competitive buyer, reducing purchases, leading to reduced output in the downstream product or
service market and higher consumer prices).
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The economic effects of worker protections, including collective
action by workers, depend in reality on market structure questions,
including the shape of the labor market supply curve and the level of
competition in the downstream market for sales to consumers.174 A
labor market with an upward-sloping supply curve will respond to
increased wage rates with increased labor output, leading to greater
output in the consumer market. A labor market with a flat or
downward-sloping supply curve will not respond to increased wage
rates or may, perversely, lead to decreased labor output. In such a
market, worker protections would lead to consumer harm. Likewise, if
the buyer of labor lacks downstream market power it will be unable to
pass higher costs on to consumers, while if it possesses downstream
market power, pass-through may be possible.175 The result is that a
sell-side exercise of labor market power may or may not offend a
consumer-focused antitrust policy.
This Part further examines the factors that tie labor market
characteristics to effects in consumer markets. It begins with a closer
look at the economic theory that explains when worker interests do and
do not ally with consumer interests. It then discusses two types of
ride-sharing markets, showing how different facts can influence the
effect of worker coordination on consumers.
A. The Concern with the Monopsonist Employer
1. The Effect of Monopsony in Labor Markets
A monopsony is a buyer-side monopoly.176 Monopsony power is
the ability of a buyer to impose transaction terms that deviate from the
competitive equilibrium.177 The monopsonist would ordinarily exercise
market power by depressing prices.178 The ordinary effect of such
reduced purchase prices is to reduce the quantity purchased, reducing
in turn the production capacity and output in the consumer market.179
This is particularly the case where the monopsonist also possesses
174.
See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Monopsony 2013: Still Not Truly Symmetric, ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Dec. 2013, at 3–5 (flat or downward-sloping input supply curves may decouple exercises
of monopsony power from price increases to consumers).
175.
See infra Sections III.A.2, IV.B.
176.
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173, at 41.
177.
Id. at 48.
178.
Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 589 (2005).
179.
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173. Blair and Harrison note that the demand
elasticity of other purchasers may be asymmetrical in any given industry depending on competing
manufacturers’ cost structures. Id. at 59. For example, if a competing manufacturer was near its
maximum efficient production capacity, it would have low elasticity of demand.
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monopoly power in the consumer market, so reduced output and
increased prices to consumers do not attract competitive entry.180
A traditional conception of a vertically structured supply chain
might involve a diffuse input market for labor or raw materials, a
concentrated production market with a single or a few large factories,
and diffuse downstream markets for distribution and consumption—a
bell curve of relative concentration that involves both monopsony
purchasing and monopoly selling. Such a vertical supply chain would
theoretically result in greater profits for the monopsonist or monopolist
at the shared expense of the input sellers (who are paid less than the
competitive price) and the consumers (who are charged more than the
competitive price).181
Not every vertical supply chain bears those characteristics.
Initially, a buyer of inputs, such as an employer purchasing labor or a
sharing economy platform contracting with workers, may or may not
have monopsony power due to several possible counterweights. These
include elasticity of supply: the more easily supply inputs can be
repurposed to other industries, the less likely high concentration in
manufacture will confer monopsony power.182 There is also the
possibility of countervailing seller power, whether unilateral or
collusive: concentration or coordination in the input (or labor) market
can create bilateral monopoly power, offsetting monopsony power that
might otherwise exist.183 A third possible corrective might be regulatory
protections in the input market, such as minimum price legislation.

180.
Id. at 48.
181.
See Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, Can Vertical Integration by a
Monopsonist Harm Consumer Welfare?, 22 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 821, 822 (2004); see also Apple Inc.
v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1525 (2019). In an industry with these characteristics, consumers’ and
workers’ interests are aligned.
182.
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173, at 58.
183.
See generally id. at 123–45. Paradoxically, collective action by workers can
increase the benefit to consumers. Eric A. Posner, The Economic Basis of the Independent
Contractor/Employee Distinction 15–16 (June 6, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3582673. If a buyer of labor has monopsony power, it will reduce the
quantity it purchases in order to drive down the price it pays. Id. at 12–13. This reduction in the
price of labor does not help consumers since it coincides with a reduction in quantity. This
reduction in quantity may or may not hurt consumers. If the labor buyer has market power as a
seller, the reduction in quantity will hurt consumers since the quantity reduction will increase
prices in the sale market. See Naidu et al., supra note 149, at 559–60. If the monopsonist buyer of
labor does not have power in the selling market, quantity in the selling market will be made up by
other sellers increasing quantity. This strategy can still be profitable to the monopsonist since the
reduction in its purchase price of labor can be sufficient to more than offset the reduction in
quantity sold. See id. at 556.
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Regulatory protections (minimum wages, health care requirements) are
a frequent characteristic of labor markets.184
Second, even in the case of a buyer with monopsony power, such
power may or may not coincide with monopoly in the downstream
market. In its most recent antitrust monopsony decision, Weyerhauser
Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., the Court recognized the
possibility of upstream market power for the purchase of logs, the most
elementary input into wood product processing, due to the localized
nature of that market. Downstream sales for processed lumber,
however, are more likely to be made in national markets.185 Another
example might be markets with differing elasticities, with inelastic
supply for inputs supporting monopsony power but elastic demand for
products undermining monopoly power.186 A lack of monopoly power
reduces the likelihood that exercise of monopsony power can harm
consumers. If exercise of buyer power reduces input costs, downstream
competition may ensure those cost reductions benefit consumers.187
The general economic principles hold whether inputs are
widgets or labor. A monopsonist employer, or a firm that contracts with
labor inputs and enjoys the requisite concentration and supply-side
inelasticity necessary to produce monopsony power, may negotiate
below-equilibrium wages.188 There is some evidence that the degree of
concentration required for monopsony may be less than that usually
required in the case of monopoly.189 Monopsony in labor markets
can be market-wide, such as a sole employer in a given geographic
market—the company town. It can also be specific to the working
relationship. Eric Posner describes the phenomenon of “relational
work,” where the laborer makes relationship-specific investments in the
buyer of labor and bears a substantial opportunity cost of shifting to
184.
See Lao, supra note 151, at 1575–76.
185.
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 321 & n.2
(2007). Logs, which are expensive to transport, are sold in localized geographic markets, while
lumber is more likely to be sold in national markets. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173, at 58
(buyer power partly determined by market share).
186.
See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173, at 58–59 (“[A]s the elasticity of supply
increases, the [buyer power index] falls.”).
187.
This is not true in all circumstances if, for example, competing producers are
already manufacturing at efficient levels, such that marginal production is more expensive.
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173; see also infra Section III.A.2.
188.
Posner, supra note 183, at 12.
189.
See Monopsony Issues in Agriculture: Buying Power of Processors in Our Nation’s
Agricultural Markets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 70 (2003)
[hereinafter Hearing on Monopsony Issues in Agriculture] (statement of Peter C. Carstensen,
George Young-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School) (identifying 10
percent or more as sufficient share to have market impacts); see generally PETER C. CARSTENSEN,
COMPETITION POLICY AND THE CONTROL OF BUYER POWER: A GLOBAL ISSUE (2017).
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another buyer. Posner describes a worker who, through concentrating
efforts on a particular job with a particular buyer of labor, acquires
skills that are more valuable to that buyer than to any other. Such a
laborer is “locked in” to the relationship with that buyer, granting the
buyer some amount of monopsony power.190
The lock-in concept that Posner identifies in labor markets has
analogs in input markets across the economy. Any large, single-purpose
investment in an input will lock the investor into a long-term
relationship with the buyer. This is frequent in the case of an industrial
parts supplier, who might make, for example, a specific automobile part
designed to specifications provided by the buyer, an automobile
manufacturer. The supplier’s entire enterprise, including the factory,
machinery, training of employees, and contracts for inputs, may well be
specific to the relationship with the automobile manufacturer. That
supplier has no realistic exit option from its relationship with the
manufacturer. Another example is a railroad, which—once having
laid tracks—is committed to relationships with geographically
proximate users of its track. Both of these are in contrast to the supplier
of a commodity input, such as raw materials, that can easily be
repurposed for other uses and shipped to other buyers. Posner identifies
a labor-market analog to the commodity input in the form of a worker
with easily repurposed skills.191
There are two primary differences between labor-market
monopsonies and those found in other input markets. Initially, the
possibility of lock-in due to relationship-specific investments is more
likely to occur in labor markets, as education, experience, regulatory
barriers such as occupational licensing, and barriers to exit make
mobility for workers more difficult than for commodity inputs. In
addition, labor-market monopsony differs from other input markets in
terms of a perception of the human cost.192 Complementary legal
schemes operate to correct for real or perceived monopsony power
in labor markets. These include federal and state wage-and-hour

190.
Posner, supra note 183, at 12. This Article expands on the concept of “lock-in” in
Section III.B, infra, and its implications for antitrust analysis in Section IV.B.
191.
Posner, supra note 183, at 10.
192.
Discussions of labor rights consistently reflect greater concern for individuals selling
labor as distinct from individuals selling products produced by their labor. It is not obvious that
one is more or less deserving or needing of legal protection in transactions with a monopsonist
than the other.
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protections,193 federal labor law granting rights to organize,194 and
exemptions from antitrust prohibitions that permit labor organization
without it being treated as cartel conduct.195
2. Do Workers and Consumers Compete for Economic Surplus?
Worker protections initially seem to conflict with antitrust law’s
goal of consumer protection. Under one view, a welfare gain realized
in a voluntary transaction can be divided among three competing
claimants: owners, workers, and consumers. In the case of the sharing
economy the claimants are the platform, the workers, and the
consumers. Surplus captured by the workers would reduce wealth
available for consumers.196
An alternative view is that worker protections go hand in
hand with consumer welfare. This argument turns on the belief that
increases in pay or benefits to workers bring supply into the market.
The increase in inputs changes the profit-maximizing output decisions
by the employer or platform, leading to an increase in output and a
commensurate decrease in the price paid by consumers.197 An extreme
statement of this view concludes that worker protections serve both
labor protection and antitrust goals at once, while also keeping costs in
check for owners.198
193.
See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062–63 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206) (establishing federal minimum wage); e.g. Minimum Wage Act, ch.
294, § 2, 1959 Wash. Sess. Laws 1411, 1413 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 49.46.020
(2020)) (establishing Washington State minimum wage).
194.
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151–69).
195.
Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17.
196.
See Balmoral Cinema v. Allied Artists Pictures, 885 F.2d 313, 316–17 (6th Cir. 1989)
(suggesting that a buyer-side agreement not to engage in competitive bidding “may lower prices to
moviegoers at the box office”); cf. Alan Devlin, Questioning the Per Se Standard in Cases of
Concerted Monopsony, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 223, 230–31 (2007) (quoting Hearing on Monopsony
Issues in Agriculture, supra note 189, at 159 (statement of R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice)). Jacobson points out that a number of courts have
relied on this heuristic when declining to apply antitrust laws with equal force in the context of
monopsony power as in the context of monopoly power. Jacobson, supra note 174, at 1–2, 6.
197.
This effect is not unique to labor inputs. For example, the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines describe a possibly harmful merger as one that creates a monopsony, “inefficiently
reducing supply . . . even if the merger will not lead to any increase in the price charged by the
merged firm for its output.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES 33 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZ35-6G8P].
198.
Cf. Randy M. Stutz, The Evolving Antitrust Treatment of Labor-Market
Restraints: From Theory to Practice, AM. ANTITRUST INST., at 2–3, 2 n.5 (July 31, 2018),
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AAI-Labor-Antitrust-WhitePaper_0-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG34-SKR9] (interpreting scholarship to conclude that
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Neither view is categorically correct. Workers bargain with the
firm (or the platform) over wages. If the labor market is characterized
by an upward-sloping supply curve, the profit-maximizing decision by
the firm (or platform) is to reduce the price paid for labor, which, in
turn, reduces the amount of labor supplied. A reduction in labor inputs
to the firm (or platform) reduces the amount of product or service it can
create. This, in turn, leads to consumer harm with reduced output and
commensurately increased prices to consumers. Under such market
conditions, protections for workers, whether regulated transaction
terms such as minimum wages or rights to engage in collective action
such as unionizing, can—by moving the price closer to the competitive
level, bringing more supply into the market, and increasing the output
in consumer markets—benefit consumers as well as workers.199
In contrast, if the labor supply curve is vertical or even
downward sloping in the relevant price range, increasing the price of
labor would not increase the quantity supplied in the input market.200
Instead, with supply static, or perhaps decreasing in the rare
circumstance of a downward-sloping labor supply curve, increasing the
price of labor would increase production costs but not increase output
in the consumer market.201 This leads to consumer harm, though
competition in the downstream market may mitigate that harm by
limiting the firm’s (or platform’s) ability to increase prices to
consumers.202 Some reason exists to believe this is the more likely
description of labor markets across broad swaths of the US economy.203

bargaining power exerted on the buyer side can reduce price paid for inputs, thereby reducing the
quantity of inputs supplied, thus raising the marginal cost of production, leading to increased
prices for consumers). In fact, the result Stutz identifies can only arise in the presence of a number
of assumptions about the market, including an upward-sloping labor supply curve and lack of
market power in the consumer market. See Devlin, supra note 196, at 232.
199.
See Posner, supra note 183. In most real-world industries, this impact will exist
regardless of monopoly power or its lack in the consumer market because the increase in output
will displace higher-cost competitors.
200.
There is some question whether one would ever identify a vertical labor supply curve
in a real-world setting. The Authors note below the possibility of a C-shaped curve, which has been
identified in scholarship on subsistence-wage markets, and under this condition the middle of the
curve reflects a state in which marginal supply is on net inelastic (likely represented by low-wage
workers exiting as their capacity is exhausted while new entrants enter in response to price
increases). See infra Section III.B.2.
201.
See Jacobson, supra note 174, at 5 (citing ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICS 377–78 (7th ed. 2009)).
202.
Unless the consumer-facing market is perfectly competitive, the Authors would expect
an increase in the price charged by the manufacturer to lead to higher cost competitors entering
the market, with the overall effect being higher prices and lower output.
203.
See infra Section IV.A.3.
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B. Workers in the Sharing Economy Enterprise
The sharing economy enterprise structure, through which
consumers and workers contract over a platform, means that erstwhile
competitors for consumer transactions may fail to compete while also
not joining forces in a traditional antitrust firm.204 In addition to
workers transacting with consumers, they enter into transactions
with the platform itself. Those transactions entail an allocation of
responsibility for the supply side of the ride-sharing transaction.
Workers provide labor and capital in the form of a compliant
automobile. Platforms provide a host of services, most notably the
software—the “app” through which workers encounter consumers in
what is normally an efficient, safe, and reliable manner—as well as
services including (1) safe and efficient payment processing; (2) the
management of the pricing algorithm; (3) rentals or leases of the
automobile;205 and (4) access to insurance.206
At its core, the sharing economy enterprise integrates workers
and the platform through which they collectively offer services to
consumers.207 As Part II discusses above, from the beginning, this has
presented labor and employment issues, with the firms providing the
app seeking to avoid employing the workers and providing attendant
benefits and protections and the workers seeking those benefits and
protections. Seen through the lens of labor economics outlined
immediately above, workers’ status as employees or contractors is less
important than the shape of the labor-market supply curve and the
degree of competition in the downstream market for providing rides to
consumers.208
Those questions, in turn, are fact bound and depend on the
specifics of a particular geographic market. At one extreme, one can
204.
Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 291.
205.
At one time Uber financed auto purchases, although that service is no longer identified
on the Uber website. See Molly Wood, Uber Drivers Struggle to Pay Subprime Auto Loans,
MARKETPLACE (May 13, 2015), https://www.marketplace.org/2015/05/13/uber-drivers-strugglepay-subprime-auto-loans/ [https://perma.cc/38D7-4RPA].
206.
See John Egan & Amy Danise, Rideshare Insurance for Uber and Lyft Drivers, FORBES
ADVISOR (Dec. 18, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/car-insurance/rideshare-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/T8ED-3M3M].
207.
Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 870 (defining “sharing economy enterprise”).
The Authors’ characterization is not entirely uncontroversial. Ride-sharing platforms more often
describe themselves as independent of both sides of the match, no more integrated with the drivers
than with the riders.
208.
There is an alternative understanding of the platform-driver relationship that may
command a different result. Professor Akman has analyzed the platform enterprise through the
lens of agency law, treating the platform as a service provider. Pinar Akman, Online Platforms,
Agency, and Competition Law: Mind the Gap, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 209, 277–78 (2019).
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imagine a market in which ride-sharing workers are best described by
the fallow-assets model, with otherwise employed individuals, students,
or retirees, who already own their vehicles, using spare time before or
after work to earn extra money. Speaking based on personal anecdote,
Huffman has described the ride-sharing market in Indianapolis,
Indiana, in this way. The fallow assets these workers contribute to the
enterprise are their existing automobiles and their leisure time.
Reports of the entrepreneurial idea underlying the sharing economy
suggest this was what the worker platform developers envisioned.
At the other extreme, one can imagine a market in which
ride-sharing workers are best described by the locked-in model,
with individuals who have made nearly irrevocable commitments to
ride-sharing as a source of revenue.209 Those individuals are likely
otherwise unemployed or marginally employed. They may have
relocated geographically in reliance on the opportunity to earn money
as a ride-sharing driver. They frequently have not previously owned a
compliant automobile and have financed their automobile—perhaps
even through Uber—based on the expectation of its use in
ride-sharing.210 Anderson, based on personal anecdote, has described
the ride-sharing market in Seattle, Washington, in this way. More
recent empirical studies of large ride-sharing markets suggest the
locked-in model is more characteristic of the industry as it has
developed over the past decade.211
In reality, of course, any given geographic market is populated
by a range of drivers, with some markets predominated by one model
and others predominated by the other. Which model accurately
209.
The Authors concentrate in this Article on ride-sharing as both the best-known and
the purest expression of a sharing economy enterprise. The lessons the Authors draw in their
research also inform other sharing economy enterprises. Lodging services through Airbnb,
https://www.airbnb.com/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2020), and task services through TaskRabbit,
https://www.taskrabbit.com/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2020), both are most likely to fit the
fallow-assets model rather than the locked-in model. Two fundamental differences drive the
analysis of these alternative platforms. First, in both cases the services offered are substantially
less commodified than in the case of ride-sharing. Second, in both cases suppliers in the respective
enterprises are substantially less likely to have made irrevocable commitments. These two
together place home-sharing and task services in the fallow-assets, rather than lock-in, model. The
result is that organization among suppliers to these enterprises is likely to present an efficiency if
there is a concern for monopsony on the part of the platform. The Authors do not investigate that
question further, but intuition suggests the existence of monopsony in those industries is unlikely.
210.
Drive, UBER, https://www.uber.com/in/en/drive/vehicle-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/
9X97-LDSK] (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) (describing options for purchasing a car, leasing a car, or
joining a fleet of cars owned by others).
211.
See Jaclyn Severance, NYC Ridesharing Study Has Implications for Policymakers,
UCONN TODAY (July 8, 2019), https://today.uconn.edu/2019/07/surprising-nyc-ridesharing-studyfindings-transit-climate-implications-policymakers-uconn-researchers-say/#
[https://perma.cc/
UZ86-FHU8].
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characterizes a particular enterprise in a particular geographic market
depends on which model predominates. This, in turn, informs the
antitrust question of worker organization. Relevant facts to distinguish
between the model to be applied include the size of the investment or
other commitment required to enter the market; the revocability of the
investment or other commitment required to enter the market; and
alternative choices available to workers in the market. Of course, any
geographic market includes drivers who fit each model. The difference
between markets is which type of driver predominates at the margin.
The remainder of this Section analyzes these two hypothetical
ride-sharing markets in terms of their likely structure and the expected
economic impact of conduct at the level of the workers and at the level
of the platform. It concludes that, perversely, the strongest economic
case for labor protections arises in markets defined by the fallow-assets
model, although the greatest need for labor protections appears to arise
in markets defined by the lock-in model.
1. Fallow Assets: The “Indianapolis” Market
Workers in a fallow-assets model use existing property and free
time to provide services in exchange for revenue. The main costs to the
workers are gas, wear and tear on their cars, and the value of their
leisure time. This worker enters the market only when the revenue to
be gained exceeds those costs and exits as soon as the calculus changes.
Early descriptions of ride-sharing as an economic innovation tended to
highlight the fallow-assets model as describing likely suppliers in
the enterprises.212 Based on anecdotal observations by the Authors,
ride-sharing workers in Indianapolis seem to fit this model—frequently
driving cars that they previously owned and driving before or after work
or on the weekends.
A fallow-assets worker has made only limited commitment to the
ride-sharing enterprise as a source of income.213 The assets to be
deployed—the car and the leisure time—are “discrete,” in Professor
Posner’s words,214 and can either be repurposed for other uses or can be
212.
See Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s
Driver-Partners in the United States 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22843,
2016).
213.
A recent study of IRS tax returns concludes that the sharing economy has not
increased the incidence of individuals earning their primary income as a contractor. Brett
Collins, Andrew Garin, Emilie Jackson, Dmitri Koustas & Mark Payne, Is Gig Work Replacing
Traditional Employment? Evidence from Two Decades of Tax Returns 13 (Mar. 25, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/19rpgigworkreplacingtraditionalemployment.pdf?smid=nytcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/TA39-JXJZ].
214.
Posner, supra note 183, at 4.
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returned to the prior state of nonuse. Fallow-assets workers can enter
and exit the sharing economy marketplace as their needs and interests
change. In particular, the value of the automobile and the leisure time
changes on the basis of competing events for these workers. For
example, when a fallow-assets worker wishes to schedule a family road
trip, the car and leisure time become more valuable, and the worker can
step out of the sharing economy marketplace until the road trip is
complete. In contrast, when the fallow-assets driver gains unexpected
leisure time or finds the car unexpectedly unused, the driver can enter
the sharing economy market. Likewise, when the earnings available by
driving increase, perhaps because the number of consumers outpaces
the number of drivers at a particular time, the fallow-assets worker can
enter the market for as long as doing so is valuable.215
In a fallow-assets model, the output of driving services is highly
susceptible to the available earnings. If the platform adjusts the
payment algorithm to shift a greater percentage of the earnings to the
workers, one would expect to see a larger number of fallow-assets
workers participate in the market, each devoting a larger proportion
of their leisure time. This effect occurs because the driver has an
upward-sloping supply curve. Aggregating those individual curves into
a market curve would likewise produce a relatively smooth upward
slope, comparable to textbook examples of labor markets.216
As Section III.A explains, in this market, in the absence of wage
discrimination, a buyer with monopsony power will offer less than the
competitive equilibrium wage rate and buy less than the competitive
equilibrium output, leading to output reductions in the consumer
market as well.217 Collective action by the workers creates
countervailing power which can raise the price and increase the output
of labor provided back toward the competitive level. This scenario can
justify joint negotiation by the drivers with the platforms over the terms
of their working relationship—in particular, over the price charged for
the rides and over the share of the price received by the drivers.
Section IV.B applies these lessons about the fallow-assets model
to show that organization by drivers in such a market, with the effect
of increasing the earnings for drivers, could reflect an efficiency that
might justify an agreement to organize under an application of the
structured Rule of Reason. This recognition might provide some
215.
The Authors note above that other sharing economy enterprises, including Airbnb and
TaskRabbit, are most likely to characterized by the fallow-assets model. See supra text
accompanying note 209. This is due to the lesser likelihood of irrevocable commitments.
216.
See generally ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS (9th ed.
2018).
217.
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173, at 45–46. See also supra Section III.A.1.
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optimism about the possibility of labor organization in the ride-sharing
context, but this optimism is muted. The drivers best able to make such
an efficiency argument are also those least likely to depend on
organizing because of their lack of lock-in.
2. Lock-In: The “Seattle” Market
The second model is the “locked-in” model, with workers that
have made irrevocable, relationship-specific investments or other
commitments to providing their services.218 For example, a locked-in
worker might likely have purchased a car specifically for ride-sharing
use, may have left other work that was believed to be less remunerative,
and, at the extreme, may have relocated to a market where sharing
economy work was likely to be more remunerative. This worker meets
Professor Posner’s definition of a “relational worker.”219 Anecdotal
observations by the authors are that the Seattle ride-sharing market is
populated by locked-in drivers.220
These workers are committed to ride-sharing both as a means
for support and as a means for discharging obligations incurred in order
to enter the marketplace. The clearest illustration of the lock-in is the
car, which both depreciates rapidly and has a lower value in other uses.
Exiting the marketplace by selling the car would, at a minimum, cause
a substantial loss to the worker and might well leave the worker with a
deficiency obligation to the auto lender and no means to make payment.
Recent popular press accounts of purchase transactions tied to service
contracts support the hypothesis. An NPR report on Uber’s now-defunct
financing program suggests a car sale to facilitate driving on the Uber
218.
The phenomenon of “lock-in” is not uncommon on the buyer side in consumer markets,
with consumers locked in to a relationship with a particular seller creating some degree of
monopoly power. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476–77
(1992) (reasoning that locked-in buyers, due to the large and unrecoverable investment in office
photocopy equipment, create market power in the aftermarket).
219.
See Posner, supra note 183, at 4.
220.
Other largely urban markets also seem to bear these characteristics. See, e.g.,
Kalmanovitz Initiative for Lab. & the Working Poor, The Uber Workplace in D.C., GEO. UNIV. 7–9
(2020) (identifying debt burden to enter the marketplace in 33 percent of drivers in
Washington, DC), https://lwp.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/319/uploads/Uber-Workplace.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PED-QFHK]. Competing studies offer different analyses of the actual
outcomes for ride-sharing workers in Seattle, and it is possible a different geographic market is a
better exemplar. See Tina Bellon, Study Suggests Most Uber, Lyft Drivers in Seattle Not
Poorly Paid, REUTERS (July 8, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-seattle-pay/studysuggests-most-uber-lyft-drivers-in-seattle-not-poorly-paid-idUSKBN2493CG
[https://perma.cc/
32EE-P3LH] (citing Louis Hyman et al., Platform Driving in Seattle, CORNELL ILR SCH. INST. FOR
WORKPLACE STUD. (July 6, 2020) (finding median earnings after expenses of $23.95 hourly, with
92 percent of drivers making more than the city minimum wage for Seattle of $16.39)). The most
recent study was funded by a grant from Uber and Lyft.
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platform resulted in the driver being locked into driving, at risk of
defaulting on the loan.221
After the up-front investment to enter the marketplace, the
locked-in worker’s opportunity cost of providing services is limited to
their leisure time. This worker is price insensitive, participating in the
market so long as the amount to be earned exceeds the value of an
hour of leisure time. The effect of this price insensitivity is that an
algorithmic reduction in compensation is unlikely to dramatically
reduce the amount of work offered either by the individual or across the
market. Instead, reducing the amount earned by the driver may reduce
the platform’s cost of offering services without reducing the volume of
output by workers, benefitting consumers of ride-sharing services.
It is even possible to theorize a below-break-even effect in which
output increases. Below the break-even price point, the first action for
locked-in drivers is to increase their output as needed to cover fixed
costs, producing a C-shaped supply curve, previously identified in
developing economies with earnings below the subsistence level.222 This
increased output in response to reduced prices would continue to a point
defined by limits on drivers’ capacity. This effect would hold for more
than the short term because of the irrevocable commitment to the
enterprise, driven largely by the payoff price of the automobile.223
The lesson from this description of the locked-in model is that
there is no consumer benefit to be gained from coordination among
drivers to raise the price of their services. Any such coordination would
not dramatically increase output, but it would raise the costs of their
services to consumers. Locked-in workers would have lesser success in
demonstrating the efficiency of coordination to raise the price of
services.

221.
Wood, supra note 205. A similar example, also reported by NPR, relates to
lease-to-own transactions in long-haul trucking. Keith Romer & Sarah Gonzalez, Big Rigged,
PLANET MONEY (Aug. 14, 2020, 3:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/901110994
[https://perma.cc/L3KL-LSRB].
222.
Cf. Purnamita Dasgupta & Bishwanath Goldar, Female Labor Supply in Rural
India: An Econometric Analysis, 49 INDIAN J. LAB. ECON. 293, 294 (2006) (“The bottom segment of
the curve is downward sloping (or forward falling), which implies that if the wage level is low, then
any further decline in wage rate may lead to increase in the supply of labour.”).
223.
At some price level, any irrevocable commitment will induce individuals to increase
output of labor as needed to cover committed expenses. Across a particular labor market, it will be
unusual to find sufficient uniformity to produce an aggregate response that reflects a market
supply curve with this characteristic. The commonality of enterprise-specific investments in a
ride-sharing market increases the likelihood that such a market will be represented by a supply
curve with a rightward downward slope below a certain minimum labor price point.
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IV. RECONCILING ANTITRUST DOCTRINE WITH SHARING ECONOMY
LABOR MARKET REALITIES
Section 1 of the Sherman Act has been interpreted to give rise to
both categorical rules and matter of degree rules.224 The per se rule
against price fixing, the single entity rule, and the labor exemption are
all categorical. They attempt to define a factual category that leads to a
legal outcome. The Rule of Reason, with its complex allocation of
burdens, focuses on the degree to which competition has been
restrained or advanced. As the Supreme Court has eliminated or
limited per se rules, it has stated a preference for the matter of degree
approach embodied in the Rule of Reason.225
In addressing whether drivers should be allowed to jointly
negotiate with platform companies, the law could rely on a categorical
rule such as the labor exemption or the matter of degree rules embodied
in the Rule of Reason. Using the labor exemption would require defining
the category of workers who are entitled to the exemption and may
require altering the current definition of that category. Using the Rule
of Reason would require determining that the per se rule against price
fixing should not apply, as well as determining how the multistep
analysis of the Rule of Reason should be applied in this situation.
Section IV.A examines several attempts by other scholars to apply a
categorical rule in this context. Section IV.B argues that the matter of
degree rules embodied in the Rule of Reason are better suited to the
task of determining when drivers should be allowed to jointly negotiate
since it can apply the economic insight that is developed in Part III.
A. Altering the Labor Exemption
Recent analyses of the problem presented here produce three
divergent approaches to accommodating collective bargaining by
224.
A categorical rule defines a legal outcome based on a set of elements that are fixed. A
matter of degree rule defines a legal outcome based on one or more variables that vary on a
spectrum. Some policies are advanced by rules of each type. For example, a policy of traffic safety
is advanced by categorical rules like speed limits. A sixty mile-per-hour speed limit promotes
traffic safety with one fixed, easily defined element. The policy of traffic safety is also promoted by
a matter of degree rule such as a prohibition on driving too fast for the conditions. One advantage
of a categorical rule is that it is easy to apply. A disadvantage of a categorical rule is that it can be
both over- and underinclusive. Rules focused on matters of degree attempt to sort those different
actors out based on a multiplicity of factors. The disadvantages of the matter of degree rules are
that they are difficult to apply and to predict.
225.
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–86
(2007) (overruling prior per se rule for resale price maintenance in favor of a Rule of Reason
analysis); Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (same for vertical market
allocation agreements).
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sharing economy workers over the terms of their relationships with the
platform. One approach, best stated in a 2018 article by Marina Lao, is
to uncouple the concept of employment for the labor exemption from
that used in state law for other purposes.226 This would continue to
treat sharing economy workers as contractors for purposes of state
employment law but treat them as employees for purposes of the labor
exemption governing collective bargaining.227 A second approach, best
outlined in a forthcoming article by Eric Posner, recognizes that the
historic control test for employee status is inconsistent with modern
economic realities, which can reduce or eliminate the practical
distinctions between contractors and employees.228 Hiba Hafiz outlines
a third approach, which touches largely tangentially on the unique
circumstance of the sharing economy, seeking to integrate labor
protections with antitrust law through an agency cooperation scheme,
as well as the development of substantive presumptions requiring
attention to worker interests.229 For different reasons, the Authors do
not believe any of these three approaches appropriately resolve the
problems of how antitrust law should apply to sharing economy
workers.
1. Uncoupling Bargaining Rights from State Law Employment
Professor Marina Lao argues for two legal outcomes for drivers
in ride-sharing enterprises. First, Professor Lao argues that drivers for
ride-share companies should not be treated as employees for all
purposes.230 Second, she argues that the drivers should be covered by
the labor exemption to the Sherman Act and allowed to collectively
negotiate with the platform companies.231 Professor Lao begins her
analysis by recognizing the efficiency-enhancing potential of sharing
economy platforms.232 Her conclusion that drivers should not be treated
as employees for all purposes is based on her assessment that granting
drivers all of the rights of employees could destroy the platform
companies and their efficiencies by imposing excessively rigid

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Lao, supra note 151, at 1583–86.
Id.
Posner, supra note 183, at 27.
See Hafiz, supra note 35.
Lao, supra note 151, at 1574.
Id. at 1567–68.
Id. at 1550–51.
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requirements related to compensation and scheduling, as well as other
terms of employment.233
Professor Lao’s second conclusion, that the drivers should be
covered by the labor exemption, requires more discussion. Professor Lao
begins by characterizing gig economy workers as straddling the line
between employees and independent contractors.234 In doing so, she
states the importance of the control that one party has over the other.235
Ride-share drivers control when and how much they work and whether
they have other jobs or work for other ride-sharing enterprises.236
Professor Lao concludes that this level of control by the driver is
inconsistent with characterization as an employee.237 However, she
points out that drivers do not have control over the price that they
charge.238 Price is, of course, a crucial aspect of any sale transaction.
Professor Lao discusses four situations in which the Supreme
Court or antitrust enforcement authorities concluded that the Sherman
Act should apply to workers facing powerful buyers. In Columbia River
Packers,239 the Court applied the Sherman Act to fishermen who sold
fish to packers and claimed to have formed a union to negotiate on their
behalf.240 In L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union,241 the Court similarly
applied the Sherman Act to sellers of reclaimed cooking grease who
claimed to have formed a union to jointly negotiate with purchasers.242
The Court faced a similar combination of workers in Superior Court
Trial Lawyers,243 where attorneys providing indigent criminal defense
in the District of Columbia went on strike for higher compensation. The
Court had no trouble concluding that this combination was illegal price
fixing.244 Finally, Professor Lao discusses the long-standing position of
federal antitrust enforcement authorities condemning combinations
of physicians formed to collectively negotiate with health insurance

233.
Id. at 1575–76. Professor Lao’s argument about the reality of imposing obligations to
comply with employment laws on the ride-sharing platforms is given support by the announcement
by Uber that it would leave the California market in response to state legislation defining its
drivers as employees. See Conger, supra note 142.
234.
Lao, supra note 151, at 1553–58.
235.
Id. at 1554–56.
236.
Id. at 1555–56.
237.
Id. at 1556.
238.
Id.
239.
Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942).
240.
Id. at 145.
241.
L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962).
242.
Id. at 98–101.
243.
FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 414–18 (1990).
244.
Id. at 436 n.19.
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plans.245 Professor Lao argues that granting antitrust immunity to
drivers for ride-sharing enterprises is consistent with the rationales of
these cases.246
According to Lao, Congress enacted the labor exemption to
protect the economic interests of workers who would suffer in a pure
market economy:
The premise of the antitrust law is that competition is generally best for the
economy, as competition is expected to “produce not only lower prices, but also better
goods and services.” The role of the Sherman Act, then, is to protect the marketplace
from unreasonable interference, whether through price fixing or other forms of
restraints on competition. Since collective bargaining by workers for higher pay and
better working conditions does interfere with the ordinary workings of the labor
market and is a form of price-fixing, it would seem to fall within the antitrust law’s
prohibitions.
However, society obviously has other values, in addition to marketplace competition,
that are worthy of protection—such as the fair treatment of workers . . . .
....
. . . Essentially, the exemption expresses a philosophy that labor markets are
different from other types of markets, and that the value of competition underlying
our antitrust laws must accommodate the value of empowering workers in seeking
fair wages and good working conditions. 247

She argues that the sellers of fish and kitchen grease were
more like independent businesspeople than drivers in ride-sharing
enterprises because they have more autonomy than the drivers and,
further, in the absence of the challenged collusion, would be market
participants competing with each other.248
Professor Lao distinguishes the doctors’ situation first by noting
that doctors have substantial incomes so a policy allowing collusion to
achieve better income does not apply.249 She also notes that while
doctors often complain about control asserted by insurance companies,
that control does not equal that of an employer over an employee.250
Further, Professor Lao notes that demand for medical services is more
inelastic than that for rides, giving doctors more market power than
drivers.251 Thus, Professor Lao concludes that drivers in ride-sharing
245.
Lao, supra note 151, at 1563–65.
246.
Id. at 1571–72.
247.
Id. at 1565–66 (footnotes omitted).
248.
Id. at 1567.
249.
Id. at 1568–69. Cf. Kim, supra note 17, 435–40 (identifying income disparities as a
justification for antitrust exceptions). One challenge to the income disparity argument is that the
characteristics of sharing economy workers are not uniform. See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 3, at 18–20.
250.
Lao, supra note 151, at 1569.
251.
Id. at 1570–73.
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enterprises should be given an exemption from the Sherman Act
because they are subject to more control than the actors in the other
situations and are poorer than doctors.252
Professor Lao views the question of whether sharing economy
workers should be allowed to jointly negotiate as one of sacrificing the
procompetition policy of the Sherman Act for the economic benefit of
sharing economy workers. She is willing to extend the labor exemption
to achieve that goal. The clearest limitation on Lao’s approach is its
failure to accommodate differing facts regarding market dynamics
based on geography. This risks trading off harm to workers against
harm to consumers in a way the solution outlined in this Article does
not.253
2. Replacing the Common Law “Control” Test with a Market Realities
Test
Eric Posner takes issue with the control test for employment,
developed at common law and adopted by statute, to establish the
divide between those entitled to employment protections, including
collective bargaining.254 Arguing that “contractor or employee status,
properly understood, depends on market structure—whether workers
operate in a competitive labor market or not,”255 Professor Posner
outlines the economic difference between employment and contracting
as a distinction between labor markets better characterized as
competitive from those better characterized as monopsonistic.256 The
character of the market, in turn, is influenced by the nature of the work,
whether it is “discrete” or “relational.”257
The more discrete the work, the easier it is for the worker to find
alternative buyers willing to bid for services, and therefore the less
monopsony power enjoyed by any one buyer with whom the worker
does business.258 In contrast, work that is highly relational reflects
buyer-specific investments by the worker, whether it be particular tools,
education, skills, or licensure.259 The relationship-specific investment
ties the worker to the employment relationship and makes alternative

252.
Id. at 1573.
253.
Section IV.B argues that in some circumstances allowing sharing economy workers to
jointly negotiate furthers the underlying Sherman Act policies. See infra Section IV.B.
254.
Posner, supra note 183, at 3–4.
255.
Id. at 3.
256.
Id.
257.
Id. at 4.
258.
Id. at 9–10.
259.
Id.
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buyers less attractive to the particular worker.260 This fact gives the
buyer some degree of monopsony power.261 The effect is that the
contractor, the worker engaged in discrete work, can rely on market
forces for basic employment protections including wages and benefits,
while the employee, the worker engaged in relational work, cannot.262
Posner applies this economic lens—which, he argues, describes the
economic relationship in labor markets better than the common-law
“control” test—to the question of legal regulation of the labor market,
with a specific focus on minimum wage laws.263
As Professor Posner recognizes, the same argument applies to
the question of bargaining rights.264 In the case of discrete work,
workers amply protected by market forces should be precluded from
collective bargaining, which would have the effect of establishing a
monopoly labor price, reducing output, and thereby harming
consumers.265 In contrast, workers performing relational work bear
significant opportunity costs in pursuing other buyers for their labor,
and the extent of these opportunity costs coincides with the amount of
bargaining power the buyer has over them. Permitting these workers
to bargain collectively, thus giving countervailing monopoly power, can
shift the price paid closer to the theoretical competitive equilibrium.266
By thus bringing workers into the market to invest in and perform this
relational work, the buyer’s output is increased and consumers
benefit.267
Finally, Professor Posner engages the difficult intersection
between worker protections either through regulation or bargaining
and antitrust law, which in ordinary cases objects to aggregating power
at any one level of a distribution chain—whether among workers
or buyers of labor.268 He reaches the necessary conclusion that
organization by sharing economy workers who are contractors violates
Section 1, while organization among employees is immunized by the
labor exemption.269 His analysis falls short when he critiques the
argument that if sharing economy suppliers are not permitted to
260.
Id. at 4.
261.
Id.
262.
Id. at 16.
263.
Id. at 14–16.
264.
Cf. id. at 16 (“Employment law and labor law counter labor monopsony, which should
generate wealth.”).
265.
Id. at 15.
266.
Id.
267.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
268.
Posner, supra note 183, at 22–24.
269.
Id. at 23; cf. supra Section II.A.
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combine for purposes of setting prices, the platform should not be
permitted to do so either.270 Professor Posner argues that “lawsuits
against Uber for cartelizing the market have failed because Uber faces
competition” and driver price fixing without market power would
violate the Sherman Act “only because of the crude per se ban on price
fixing.”271 The first proposition misstates the resolution of lawsuits
against Uber in US federal courts, which are dismissed due to
competition only in the case of a monopolization claim.272 The second
proposition too hastily rejects the value of per se rules in ensuring ease
of administrability for challenges to conduct with obvious harm and
limited or no social value. Section IV.B, argues that avoiding the
application of the per se rule to joint negotiation by sharing economy
workers requires greater justification than merely rejecting per se
rules.
Professor Posner’s application of his economic lens to the
circumstance of sharing economy workers is necessarily stylized and
does not provide a satisfying resolution of the labor rights-antitrust
conflict the sharing economy presents. The observation that
“[g]ig-economy workers float somewhere between the traditional
employee and the traditional contractor”273 is an effective shorthand,
which explains legislative efforts around the globe toward a third
classification, as well as Professor Lao’s suggestion for uncoupling labor
law from state employment law.274 It is unclear that this approach is
generalizable across sharing economy enterprises, however. It also may
ignore important distinctions among workers in any one enterprise. The
structured analysis in Section IV.B builds on Professor Posner’s
economic lens and his challenge to the control test, while attempting a
more nuanced treatment of the circumstance of organizing by workers
on sharing economy enterprises.

270.
Posner, supra note 183, at 23 (critiquing Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring
Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implications, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, 236–39
(2017)); cf. Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 862 (Uber agreement reflects a hub-and-spoke
cartel in the absence of a unilateral conduct argument).
271.
Posner, supra note 183, at 23.
272.
See, e.g., Desoto Cab. Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-06385-JSW, slip op. at 5–8
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2020) (dismissing predation claims against Uber due to the plaintiff’s failure
to sufficiently allege a monopoly position).
273.
Posner, supra note 183, at 21.
274.
See IUS LABORIS, THE BYWORD: THE GIG ECONOMY 8–9 (2018), https://iuslaboris-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/media/filer_public/9f/d5/9fd5b984-cb21-42fb-8445-cb0a28eedc2a/iuslaboris_the_byword_the_gig_economy_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/86M8-TQ7U]; Lao, supra note 151,
at 1583–86; see also supra Section IV.A.1.
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3. Cooperative Oversight Between Antitrust and Labor Agencies
Hiba Hafiz acknowledges the connection between labor market
buyer power and harms felt in the consumer market but argues that,
empirically, this connection does not play out in most cases.275
“[C]ommentators concede that prices to consumers will not increase”
from exercises of labor market monopsony power “if product markets
are competitive or when ‘reduced sales . . . will be offset’ by new firms’
sales.”276 The possibility (and empirical frequency) of wage
discrimination also allows exercises of monopsony power without
reducing labor inputs, thus not affecting output or prices to
consumers.277 In Part III, the Authors analyze these realities in the
context of the sharing economy and ride-sharing specifically.278
Because of this empirical reality, a purely consumer-focused
antitrust law is unlikely to protect against monopsony power in labor
markets. Professor Hafiz identifies places where enforcement may
operate to the benefit of workers, including in the context of horizontal
agreements with clear impacts on wages or worker movement.279 Other
instances, including mergers and labor market restraints not subject to
the per se rule, are ambiguous concerning likely enforcement decisions
and litigation outcomes.280 Professor Hafiz identifies examples of
monopsony conduct in labor markets that are permitted based on
benefits to consumers.281 Additionally, “when labor market restraints
benefit workers and not consumers, the consumer welfare standard
trumps.”282
Professor Hafiz suggests a regulatory-sharing approach in
which the National Labor Relations Board and the Department of Labor
would share responsibility for antitrust review of mergers, which under
current law is conducted by either the Justice Department or Federal
Trade Commission without input from the Department of Labor.283 The
labor agencies would serve a fact-finding function and would have
power separately to review efficiency defenses.284 Under Professor
Hafiz’s approach, the labor agencies would follow a public interest
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Hafiz, supra note 35, 397–98.
Id. at 391 (quoting Naidu et al., supra note 149, at 559 n.93).
Id. at 391–92.
See supra Section III.B (describing characteristics of ride-sharing markets).
Hafiz, supra note 35, at 389 (horizontal no-poach and wage-fixing agreements).
Id. at 393–94.
Id. at 394–96.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 407.
See id. at 407–09.
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standard, akin to that followed by other agencies with concurrent
jurisdiction over sector-specific mergers.285 Most pertinent to the labor
market problems in sharing economy enterprises, Professor Hafiz
argues that the classification of workers as contractors or employees
should take into account monopsony power held by buyers of labor
inputs.286
Among the three approaches outlined here, Hafiz’s approach
does the least to alter existing substantive legal standards and theories
of antitrust law. A consultative role and concurrent oversight authority
by labor agencies of conduct and mergers implicating worker interests
would permit antitrust to operate, and the law to develop, as it
currently does. It would only require additional cooperation among
agencies, with the most likely impact being a slowdown of the oversight
function. In the context of mergers, this may present particular
concerns. The most potent critique of Professor Hafiz’s approach is its
failure to acknowledge the political challenges inherent in agency
cooperation. An important difference with the cooperation suggested
here is the divergent goals of the agencies’ work. One might expect
substantial conflict to arise, ultimately requiring courts to determine
which approach to favor in a particular case. In this way, Hafiz’s
argument may be thought to offer little improvement over pure
incorporation of divergent goals through the common-law process.
Professor Hafiz seeks to address the potential tension between
the interests of consumers and workers by allocating differing
responsibilities to antitrust and labor law and authorities. Antitrust
would advance the interests of consumers and labor law would advance
the interests of workers. Section IV.B argues that the interests of
consumers and workers are consistent when the buyer of workers’
services has monopsony power. It also analyzes when such monopsony
power is likely to exist in the sharing economy context.
In summary, Professors Lao, Posner, and Hafiz use different
approaches to examine the potential tension between the interests of
consumers and workers. They each turn to the labor exemption or labor
law to answer the question. Professor Lao concludes that the labor
exemption should apply to sharing economy workers to advance their
interest. Professor Posner concludes that the labor exemption is
consistent with consumer interests since it allows workers to overcome
monopsony power of buyers of labor. Professor Hafiz concludes that
labor law should collaborate with antitrust law, with labor law pursuing
workers’ interests and antitrust law pursuing consumer interests.
285.
286.

Id. at 408.
See id. at 406.
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Section IV.B argues that the Sherman Act’s Rule of Reason should be
used to permit joint negotiation by sharing economy workers when it is
consistent with the interests of consumers.
B. Harnessing the Rule of Reason to Protect Some Sharing Economy
Workers
This Section identifies two possible understandings of the
market for ride-share driving. In the first, which this Article calls the
fallow-assets model of the market, the predominant suppliers have the
option to enter and exit at their leisure. The effect is that at higher labor
prices the output of driving services would be higher and at lower prices
the output would be lower, represented by the classic upward-sloping
supply curve for labor. A single buyer of labor in this market has some
degree of monopsony power, enabling it to reduce the price for labor and
accept the reduced output. In the second, which this Article calls the
locked-in model of the market, the predominant suppliers have made
irrevocable commitments to their work in ride-sharing. In this market,
higher prices may bring others into the market, increasing output, but
lower prices would not necessarily reduce output—in fact, below a
break-even price point, lower prices may increase output as locked-in
drivers work to ensure they can meet expenses. This C-shaped supply
curve ensures the monopsonist buyer of driving services has
extraordinary monopsony power, enabling it to reduce prices for labor
substantially.287
The effect of these two exercises of monopoly power on
consumers differs. With an upward-sloping supply curve more
characteristic of ordinary input markets, the reduced labor price
reduces output, in turn reducing output and raising the price in
consumer markets. In this market, collective action by drivers that
pushed the price for labor back toward the competitive equilibrium
would increase output both in the labor and in the consumer markets.
In contrast, with a C-shaped supply curve, which is near vertical
at some price point and downward sloping at lower prices, the effect of
organization by drivers in the locked-in market to raise prices depends
on where in the range prices are in the absence of organization. At very
low prices, below the break-even point for locked-in drivers, an increase
would reduce output, as overworked drivers take advantage of the
ability to experience leisure time after reaching their earnings
threshold. At this low end of the price range, the effect of organization
to increase prices would be to increase price and reduce output for
287.

See supra Section III.B; see also supra note 164.
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consumers. In the middle of the price range, a price increase would not
impact output meaningfully because the vertical supply curve implies
price insensitivity for drivers covering costs.288 In this range, the effect
of organization would be to increase prices and reduce output in the
consumer market. Finally, at a high enough price point, the effect in the
locked-in market would mirror the effect in the fallow-assets market,
as drivers increase output, incentivized by higher prices. Like in the
fallow assets case, in this range, collective action would benefit
consumers by increasing output and reducing prices to consumers.
Intuition suggests that across the realistic price ranges for ride-share
driving, locked-in markets would see worker interests and consumer
interests in tension, rather than in concert.
The divergent effects on consumers of an agreement among
drivers, depending on which model of the market prevails, could impact
the answers to at least three legal questions under Section 1. First,
should an agreement among drivers to jointly negotiate with the
platform company be per se illegal? Second, would a plaintiff asserting
a claim against the drivers under the Rule of Reason satisfy its
threshold burden to show the likelihood of anticompetitive effects
quickly, without a thorough analysis of the market? Third, if a plaintiff
makes such a showing, would the possible pro-consumer outcome of an
agreement among the drivers if traditional monopsony power is
present, constitute a procompetitive justification available to the
drivers under the second question of the Rule of Reason?
1. Is the Drivers’ Agreement Per Se Illegal?
As Section II.A demonstrates, it is ordinarily easy to conclude
that an agreement among competitors affecting price is per se illegal.
In ordinary circumstances, such an agreement raising prices reduces
output and hurts consumers. However, the Supreme Court has
sometimes declined to apply the per se rule to horizontal agreements
directly or indirectly impacting price. In both Professional Engineers 289
and Board of Regents,290 the Court declined to apply the per se rule to a
no-bid agreement and an output restriction, both of which could
be expected to raise the price of the services. Likewise, in Broadcast
Music Inc. v. CBS,291 the Court interpreted a blanket license offered by

288.
The price insensitivity is in the aggregate across the market. New entrants will make
up for reduction in output as locked-in workers reduce hours once their expenses are covered.
289.
Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694–95 (1978).
290.
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984).
291.
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1979).
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competing performing artists, which stated that an agreed price point
for respective music offerings was not a per se illegal price fix.292
The per se rule against price fixing is aimed at agreements that
reduce output and hurt consumers. An assertion that drivers’ joint
negotiation with the platforms would increase output and reduce prices
to consumers by overcoming the output-reducing effects of monopsony
power is aimed at the theoretical core of this rule. If the drivers’
agreement could increase output, leading to an output increase and
commensurate price decrease in the consumer market, there is a good
argument that the per se rule should not apply.
In deciding whether a per se rule should apply, the Supreme
Court has focused on two criteria. First, per se rules should be invoked
only when the restraints being assessed would almost always be found
to be anticompetitive upon further scrutiny:
Resort to per se rules is confined to restraints . . . “that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output” . . . To justify a per se
prohibition a restraint must have “manifestly anticompetitive” effects . . . and
“lack . . . any redeeming virtue.”293

A drivers’ agreement to jointly negotiate with the platform
companies might decrease output or it might increase output,
depending on the nature of the market in question and in particular
whether the supply curve is upward sloping, vertical, or downward
sloping in the relevant range.294 Under a plausible, and likely extant in
some geographical areas, model of the labor market in ride-sharing, the
drivers’ agreement could lead to a procompetitive increase in output.
Thus, the per se rule should not apply to driver organizing behavior.
A second criterion the Court considers in deciding whether to
apply a rule of per se illegality is the extent of experience courts have
with restraints of this type. “[T]he per se rule is appropriate only after
courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at
issue . . . and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be
invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason.”295 Of
course, a drivers’ agreement to jointly negotiate with the platforms
would arise in the context of the sharing economy, which the Authors
have described as disrupting existing commercial structures in
292.
Largely on an application of Broadcast Music, in prior scholarship, the Authors argued
that the hub-and-spoke agreement between the platform and the workers in a ride-sharing
enterprise should not be treated under the per se rule. See Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at
911.
293.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (emphasis
added).
294.
See supra Section III.B.
295.
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886–87 (citations omitted).
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meaningful, and not fully understood, ways.296 Due to the novelty of the
sharing economy, courts continue to have very little experience
applying the Sherman Act to these relationships. This lack of
experience urges caution in applying per se rules.
This Article has demonstrated that organization by ride-share
drivers is not protected by the labor exemption from antitrust and
would under traditional antitrust doctrine represent a per se illegal
price fix.297 However, unique features of the ride-sharing labor market
and its impact on consumers renders the per se rule a bad fit for this
industry, likely to produce an intolerable level of false positives in the
presence of uncertainty about the actual effects of labor market
organization.
2. Would a Plaintiff Satisfy Its Initial Burden Under the Rule of
Reason Quickly?
In the absence of the simple per se rule, the complex
burden-shifting analysis of the Rule of Reason would be invoked. The
threshold question under the Rule of Reason is whether the plaintiff
can demonstrate a likelihood that the challenged agreement has
anticompetitive effects.298 In both Board of Regents and Professional
Engineers, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had made such a
showing without engaging in a thorough analysis of the market,
establishing the quick look Rule of Reason. Prior scholarship has
argued that the hub-and-spoke agreement among the platform and
ride-share drivers was appropriately considered under the quick look
approach.299 That agreement touches on the most competitively
sensitive of transaction terms—price—and is directed at the consumer
market. It is not a per se illegal price fix because the agreement
supports the existence of ride-sharing as a business model, enabling
instantaneous contracting without real-time negotiation.300
An agreement among competing drivers aimed at increasing the
price of their services, likewise targeting the most competitively
sensitive of transaction terms, might seem to be worthy of quick look
treatment under the first question of the Rule of Reason for the same
reason that the platforms’ agreements with ride-share drivers are.
However, in the analogous case of California Dental,301 the Supreme
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1.
See supra Part II.
See supra text accompanying notes 98–108.
Anderson & Huffman, supra note 1, at 914–16.
Id.
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
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Court declined to apply the quick look approach. The Commission
alleged that the dental association had restricted truthful advertising
regarding prices and quality. The Ninth Circuit had applied the quick
look approach in condemning the agreement.302 The Supreme Court
reversed since it thought that the quick look approach applied in Board
of Regents and Professional Engineers put too lenient a burden on the
plaintiff.303 Justice Souter’s majority opinion noted that the advertising
restrictions might have procompetitive effects by avoiding misleading
advertising.304 He also acknowledged that the restrictions might have
anticompetitive effects.305 The ambiguity of outcomes precluded a quick
look approach to the threshold question of the Rule of Reason. “[T]he
plausibility of competing claims about the effects of the professional
advertising restrictions rules out the indulgently abbreviated review to
which the Commission’s order was treated. The obvious anticompetitive
effect that triggers abbreviated analysis has not been shown.”306 Given
competing claims about the effects of the agreement, the plaintiff bore
the burden of a more thorough market analysis, demonstrating the
conduct presented a likelihood of harm to consumers.307
In light of the two equally plausible states of the labor market
in question and the uncertainty regarding which state prevails in a
particular geographic market, an agreement among drivers in
ride-sharing enterprises to jointly negotiate with the platform company
could be subject to a similar analysis. As in California Dental, there are
two possibilities concerning the competitive effects of the agreement. In
a locked-in model, over the most likely price range, the vertical or
downward-sloping supply curve implies joint negotiation to raise prices
would reduce output and raise prices in the labor market, ultimately
harming consumers. In a fallow-assets model, characterized by the
classic upward-sloping supply curve, the agreement could counteract
the effects of monopsony power, thereby raising labor prices, increasing
labor output, and leading to an output increase in the consumer market.
The crucial question distinguishing the quick look from the “full
blown Rule of Reason” is who bears the burden of resolving this
question.308 In California Dental, a similar uncertainty as to the effect
on consumers from observed conduct was present. The Court held that
the burden was on the plaintiff to address this question under the first
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 763.
Id. at 769–71.
Id. at. 771–73.
Id. at 778.
Id.
See id. at 776.
Hovenkamp, supra note 113, at 101–02.
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step of the Rule of Reason. The allocation of the burden is important
since, as in California Dental, the facts might make the question hard
to resolve.309 In such a circumstance, the party bearing the burden will
lose in the presence of uncertainty.
As a practical matter, bearing this burden would require a
plaintiff to challenge collective action by ride-sharing workers to
establish key facts about the nature of the market. Whether the
plaintiff is the platform, a government enforcer, or possibly a class of
consumers,310 the Rule of Reason would require that plaintiff to show
that labor organization threatens increased prices or reduced output in
the consumer market. This, in turn, requires a showing of the nature of
the labor market and the likely effect on output from an increased price
for labor. In the presence of uncertainty, this is a heavy burden.
3. If the Burden Shifts to the Drivers, What Is the Nature of the
Burden?
The second question under the Rule of Reason would be whether
the drivers could point to a procompetitive justification for their
agreement.311 The drivers would assert the possibility of procompetitive
effects from an agreement counteracting a platform’s exercise of
monopsony power. A procompetitive effect from this agreement would
be to increase the output of labor and thereby increase output in the
consumer market. The practical requirement would be, in effect, to
counteract the market analysis required of the plaintiff, demonstrating
the market in this case saw or would see, increased labor output in
response to a price increase.
The exact nature of the burden on the defendant drivers is
important. Do the drivers bear the burden of persuasion on this
question, or merely a burden of producing evidence? Here an agreement
among drivers may have procompetitive effects or anticompetitive
effects, depending on whether the supply curve for driving is upward
sloping or downward sloping in the relevant range, which is itself a
challenging fact to establish. Do the drivers need to persuade the trier
of fact that the drivers’ agreement is overcoming platform monopsony
power to the benefit of consumers? Alternatively, do the drivers merely
need to produce evidence that this is occurring?
309.
Id.
310.
Whether consumers would have standing to sue over a price agreement among drivers
depends on the application of the direct purchaser rule in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 738–39 (1977).
311.
See supra Section II.A; Hovenkamp, supra note 113, at 103; Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,
138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018).
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The exact nature of the burden on the defendants for the second
question of the Rule of Reason is uncertain. Professor Hovenkamp
defines this burden as one of producing evidence: “If the defendant is
unable to defeat the prima facie case and offers no justification, then
the plaintiff is entitled to prevail. By contrast, if the defendant does
provide evidence of a procompetitive justification the burden may shift
a second time.”312 Another source interprets Board of Regents to impose
a higher burden of persuasion, rather than mere production in some
circumstances.313 Because Board of Regents involved inherently
problematic conduct and subjected it to the quick look, the better
approach to the full-blown Rule of Reason is that articulated by
Professor Hovenkamp. The effect is to impose a relatively light
obligation on ride-share drivers defending a claim for organizing to
show the possibility of procompetitive effects from that organization.
The analysis here leads to an important and somewhat
uncomfortable conclusion. The market-structure scenario that leads to
the conclusion that procompetitive effects are likely is the fallow-asset
model, with its upward-sloping supply curve. In such a market, an
agreement among drivers would counteract monopsony power, raise
price, and increase output in the labor market, leading to a reasonable
likelihood of consumer benefit. The Rule of Reason could identify these
cases and legalize the agreement among drivers. However, these are
least likely to be the workers in real need of labor organization, in light
of their economic choices.
In contrast, in the locked-in model, no such procompetitive effect
would flow from a drivers’ agreement to jointly negotiate if prices are in
a low range. In the locked-in scenario, the supply curve, over the range
of prices expected to prevail, is vertical or downward sloping. An
agreement among the drivers to jointly negotiate could increase
price, but that would lead to a decrease, or perhaps no change, in
labor-market output. This reduction in output could be expected to hurt
consumers. Therefore, the Rule of Reason would condemn an agreement
among locked-in drivers, who have the fewest economic choices. This
leaves the necessity of regulatory interventions in the form of
wage-and-hour and other protections that exist for employees
throughout the economy.314

312.
Hovenkamp, supra note 113, at 103–04.
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V. CONCLUSION
For more than a century, courts have interpreted the Sherman
Act to apply to an economy constantly transforming in response to
changes in technology and business structures. In doing so, courts have
been informed by an evolving understanding of the economics of
different relationships among market participants. The focus of this
process has been on the welfare of consumers. The categorical
approaches of the per se rules and the matter of degree approach of the
Rule of Reason, with its shifting burdens, have been the primary tools
in this process. Occasionally, Congress has altered the results of this
judicial process by creating exemptions from the Sherman Act such as
the labor exemption. The creation of the sharing economy has posed
major challenges for this process of evolution. The law is only beginning
to respond to these challenges.
As workers in the sharing economy look to the possibility of
jointly negotiating with sharing economy platform companies for better
compensation, the legal structures created for participants in
traditional firms pose grave risks for the workers. Such joint
negotiations look like a price-fixing cartel of suppliers subject to the per
se rule against price fixing by competitors. Even if the per se rule does
not apply, the joint negotiations look illegal under the quick look version
of the Rule of Reason. If the sharing economy workers try to raise the
shield of the labor exemption, they are met with the likely conclusion
that they are independent contractors, not employees, and are therefore
not exempt.
However, courts have long been open to new understandings of
the economics underlying the antitrust laws. This is especially the case
in new enterprise structures, like those in the sharing economy. Cartels
are treated harshly because they hurt consumers by raising prices and
reducing output. If a monopsonist buyer of labor has reduced output in
an effort to lower the prices it pays for labor, consumers could be hurt
by that reduction in output. An agreement among workers could raise
their compensation which would increase output and help consumers.
This applies both to employees and to workers in the sharing economy.
How should the law take this into account for workers in the sharing
economy? One possibility is to extend the labor exemption to sharing
economy workers. Another is to use the Rule of Reason.
In the case of sharing economy workers who are drivers for
ride-sharing enterprises, there are two models of drivers. In the
fallow-assets model, drivers have not made a relationship-specific
investment in their car. They own the car for other purposes and use it
to supplement their income by driving. By contrast, in the locked-in
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model, drivers bought the car to drive for the ride-sharing enterprise.
This relationship-specific investment has important ramifications.
Locked-in drivers need to drive enough to pay for their car expenses, as
well as their other living expenses. Fallow-asset drivers have typical
reactions to compensation. They are incentivized to drive more when
price is high than when it is low. Therefore, when a monopsonist buyer
lowers price, quantity goes down. This reduction in quantity can injure
consumers. On the other hand, locked-in drivers have a different
response to reductions in price. They cannot drive less, since they need
to make the payments on the car that they bought so they could be
drivers for the platform (as well as their other expenses). In response to
a price reduction by a powerful seller, the locked-in driver will not drive
less, and might drive more. Therefore, there is not quantity reduction
to hurt consumers.
The differing reactions by fallow-asset drivers and locked-in
drivers to price reductions by powerful buyers has important
implications for how the law should respond to agreements among
drivers designed to increase their compensation by jointly negotiating
with platform companies. Such a joint negotiation agreement among
fallow-asset drivers could increase price toward the competitive level.
This higher price would lead to an increase in quantity produced,
serving to benefit consumers. However, an agreement among locked-in
drivers designed to increase their compensation could reduce quantity
and hurt consumers. A consumer-oriented antitrust law should allow
the agreement among fallow-asset drivers and condemn the agreement
among locked-in drivers. A structured application of the Rule of Reason
could accomplish this set of outcomes. However, how should the law
deal with uncertainty about whether fallow-asset drivers or locked-in
drivers predominate at the margin in any particular geographic
market? The burden-shifting structure of the Rule of Reason answers
this question by imposing the initial burden of characterizing the
market on a plaintiff challenging an agreement among drivers. This is
a substantial burden.
This analysis leaves open the possibility that a plaintiff
challenging an agreement among drivers might successfully establish
that the predominate drivers at the margin in the market are locked-in
and that the agreement has reduced quantity to the detriment of
consumers. In such a case, the Rule of Reason would conclude that the
agreement is illegal. This conclusion is potentially troubling for reasons
unrelated to a consumer-focused antitrust law. Locked-in drivers are
locked in because they are economically disadvantaged. For an
antitrust law focused on consumers, this is irrelevant. However, society
has other values. Achieving those values across the entirety of the
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ride-sharing labor market will require some alternative solution, which
might emerge by legislation or by aggressive extension of the labor
exemption through the common-law process.

